Critical
Commentary

Contents

Critical Commentary

The Student Journal of Newman University College

Newman University College

Volume 2 Number 1 (Spring 2009)

GUIDELINES FOR POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS

Critical Commentary welcomes articles from undergraduate and postgraduate students which discuss topics of importance and interest from all subject areas of the University College. Articles may be written from a variety of perspectives including education, philosophy, history, management, professional studies, psychology, sociology or theology.

Articles accepted for publication should not exceed 7,000 words including references. Critical Commentary will hold the copyright of the article if it is subsequently published. Articles should not have been sent to another journal for consideration.

Two copies of the article should be sent to:

Professor Stan Tucker
Editor, Critical Commentary:
The Student Journal of Newman University College
Newman University College, Genners Lane, Bartley Green, Birmingham, B32 3NT
Phone: 0121 4761181 ext: 2296
Fax: 0121 4761196
Email: s.a.tucker@newman.ac.uk

Manuscripts that do not conform to the requirements listed below will not be considered for publication.

- Articles can only be considered if two complete copies of each manuscript are submitted. After an article has been accepted an electronic copy will be requested.

- The articles should be typed (font size 12 Tahoma) on one side of the paper, double line-spaced, with ample margins, and bear the title of the contribution, name(s) of the author(s), the full postal address of the author who will check proofs and receive correspondence. Offprints should also be included.

- All pages should be numbered.

- Footnotes to the text should be avoided.

- Each article should be accompanied by an abstract of no more than 200 words together with three to five keywords. The abstract should be submitted on a separate sheet to the main text.

- References should be indicated in the typescript by giving the author's surname (without initials), with the year of publication in parenthesis.

- When referencing direct quotations, please use the following format, (Brookes, 1998: 3) this would indicate that the Surname is Brookes, the Year was 1998, and the page number is 3. Single citation marks must also be used around the quotation.

- If several books/papers by the same author and from the same year are cited, a, b, c, etc. should be put after the year of publication.

- The references should be listed in alphabetical order at the end of the paper in the following standard form:
  For books: Ball, S (1990) Politics and Policy Making in Education (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul).
  For articles: Johnson, R. (1989) Thatcherism and English education: breaking the mould or confirming the pattern? History of Education, 18 (2), 3-34.
  Titles of journals should not be abbreviated.
  For chapters within books: Ranson, S. (1990) From 1944 to 1988: education, citizenship and democracy. In M. Flude and M. Hammer (eds) The Education Reform Act 1988: Its Origins and Implications (Basingstoke, Falmer).

- Tables and Figures, must be reproduced on separate sheets and not included as part of the text. Tables should be numbered by Roman numerals, and Figures by Arabic numerals. The approximate position of tables and figures should be indicated in the manuscript.

- Proofs will be sent to the author(s) and should be corrected and returned to the Assistant Editor: Claire Smith (ext: 2466 or e-mail: claire.smith@newman.ac.uk) within 14 days. Major alterations to the text cannot be accepted.

- A PDF offprint is supplied free on publication.

SECOND VOLUME

This edition of Critical Commentary marks the publication of the second volume of the journal. Articles published in the first volume have been well received by staff and students alike. There can be no doubt that Critical Commentary is now a very well established part of the academic landscape of Newman University College. The Editorial Board set tself in the first edition the aim of producing 'an interdisciplinary academic journal that captures many of the debates and dilemmas that shape contemporary society'. In reviewing earlier editions it is safe to say that we have moved some considerable way down that road and in doing so have established a journal that we can proudly describe as critically robust. Important themes and issues have been tackled such as the impact of gender on academic ability, religious fundamentalism and physical activity and body composition in children. There is clearly enthusiasm on the part of students to have their work published for a wider audience. Thanks are due to all those who have contributed so far.

This edition brings together an interesting mixture of contributions from across subject areas. The first and penultimate articles in this edition of Critical Commentary have been written by students working in the history subject area. The first 'Field Marshal Earl Haig: Victim of History?' examines changing public perceptions of Haig over the last eighty years. The penultimate article explores the Falklands Crisis of 1982 and the failed diplomacy of the US Secretary of State Alexander Haig. The second article from PESS explores the issue of how images of female magazine models impact on matters of self-esteem, mood and perception in women. The connection between body mass index and image is also considered. The third and final articles have a specific arts focus. In the article 'Eclectic Approach to Modern Drama', the author argues that such an approach is potentially 'more useful and appropriate than the work of any lone author'. In the final article, the author presents a linguistic stylistic analysis of The Beatles' British singles. The argument is made that the lyrics provide us with 'important literary discourse'.

Professor Stan Tucker
Editor
Newman University College
April 2009

Field Marshal Earl Haig: Victim of History?

Richard Thornton

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to investigate why the modern day public perception of Field Marshal Earl Haig is so terrible and his reputation so utterly vilified, in comparison to eighty years ago, when his death caused unparalleled scenes of mourning and sorrow, and to discover when this change occurred.

The findings will reveal that after the First World War the generals and the politicians began their own war, one in which Haig never publicly took part. A war of words to decide who should receive the acclaim for victory and who should shoulder the responsibility for any failure; a war this time that the generals were unfortunately to lose. They will also reveal that it was the turbulent decade of 1960's that was ultimately responsible for the changed public perception of Haig, a view however that was smuggled unknowingly from the 1930s. But most importantly what is revealed is that Haig is a victim of history.

KEYWORDS

First World War, Haig, history, reputation.

Introduction

On Tuesday 31st January 1928, The Times reported, 'We deeply regret to record the death of Field-Marshal Earl Haig, which took place in London at midnight on Sunday at 21, Prince's-gate, S.W' (The Times, Jan 31, 1928 p12). The post-mortem, carried out on the previous day, revealed that the cause of death had been heart failure, 'the result of the effects of the War and previous tropical and campaigning services on the heart muscles' (The Times, Jan 31, 1928 p12). Haig was sixty six years old.

The news of his sudden and unexpected death came as a complete shock to both the nation and the Empire as a whole, erupting into an immense display of public grief at every level; 'the mass demonstration of sadness following the death of Haig was unusual, both in its scale and also its evocation of loss' (Mead, 2007 p377).

From Wednesday 1st February, Haig's body lay in state at St Columba's (Church of Scotland) on Pont Street for two days (The Times, Feb 01, 1928 p14) where an estimated 50,000 people paid their respects (Mead, 2007). The day of the funeral, Friday 3rd February, saw the streets lined with almost one million mourners as Haig's coffin, borne on the gun carriage that carried the body of the Unknown Soldier in 1920, was taken to Westminster Abbey (Mead, 2007). When the service was over, the coffin was taken by train to Edinburgh, where at St Giles Cathedral it lay in state once more, with 'The line of people waiting four abreast to gain admission to the Cathedral extended sometimes for nearly quarter of a mile, and stretched this afternoon for a full mile' (The Times, Feb 06, 1928 p12). The body of Field Marshal Earl Haig was finally laid to rest on Tuesday 7th February 1928 close to his home of Bemersyde, in the grounds of the ruins of Dryburgh Abbey. Historian Dan Todman, is of the opinion that, 'If the crowds are any measure of national mourning, the British felt worse about losing Sir Douglas Haig than they did about losing Princess Diana' (Todman, 2005 p73). Haig's reputation has however not survived the passing of time, and in marked contrast to the extraordinary scenes in London and Edinburgh the popular perception of Haig is 'he killed as many of his own men as Stalin and Hitler put together' (Mead, 2007 p1), and '…public pronouncements concerning Haig now drip with venom usually reserved for only the worst war criminals' (Wiest, 2005 pxi). Why then, eighty years later, is the public perception of Haig so terrible and his reputation so utterly vilified?

The modern stereotypical image of a British First World War general is that of an old, overweight, grey-haired, large moustached, vain, incompetent, uncaring cavalryman, who lives far from the frontline in a comfortable chateaux and whose only tactic in his pursuit of war is the frontal attack, regardless of the number of casualties this may incur (Corrigan, 2003). Military historians Alan Clark, The Donkeys (Clark, 1961), and John Laffin, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (Laffin, 1988), have helped to create, encourage and support this image, with the titles of 'donkey' and 'butcher' now synonymously applied to the men who led the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). That this image has been brought to life by television has given it all the more substance and in the eyes of the viewer made it all the more believable, with the BBC comedy series starring Rowan Atkinson, Blackadder Goes Forth, being perhaps the prime example of this. It is worthy of note here, that during a conference at Salford University in May

2000, on the First World War, a number of secondary schools within the area were named which had adopted Blackadder Goes Forth as the main text for First World War studies at GCSE level (Bond, 2002). The image now, not only portrayed and accepted by the media but also within the realms of education too. Stephen Badsey believes, 'The debate about the nature of the Great War and our historical understanding of it is now out of academia, into popular culture, and on our television screens' (Badsey, 2002 p45). And we now therefore have 'Two Western Fronts…….the Western Front of literature and popular culture against the Western Front of history' (Bond, 2002 p86-87). In the realms of public perception, due to the former, Haig is the exemplification of the archetypical 'donkey'.

The first episode of *Blackadder Goes Forth, Captain Cook*, depicts an unrivalled image of this as *General Melchett* and *Captain Darling* attempt to brief *Captain Blackadder* on Haig's secret strategy for winning the war.

Melchett: *Now Field Marshal Haig has formulated a brilliant tactical plan to ensure final victory in the field.*

Blackadder: *Would this brilliant plan involve us climbing over the top of our trenches and walking slowly towards the enemy?*

Darling: *How did you know that, Blackadder? It's classified information.*

Blackadder: *It's the same plan that we used last time, sir. And the seventeen times before that.*

They all move over to the desk.

Melchett: *E-e-exactly! And that's what's so brilliant about it. It will catch the watchful Hun totally off guard. Doing exactly what we've done eighteen times before will be the last thing they'll expect us to do this time. There is, however, one problem.*

Blackadder: *That everyone always gets slaughtered in the first ten seconds?* (Curtis et al, 1989 p354).

Predominately, what the majority associate with Haig and the First World War 'can be summed up in two words: Somme and Passchendaele' (Terraine, 2003 p183).

The portrayal of both of these battles concentrates on images of mud, blood and slaughter, but what seems to be forgotten is that they were in fact '….strategic successes, not least in the amount of attritional damage they inflicted on the Germans' (Sheffield, 2002). In 1996 the BBC television programme Timewatch screened an episode entitled Douglas Haig: The Unknown Soldier, to coincide with the eightieth anniversary of the Somme. Historians on both sides of the Haig debate took part in the programme which 'was an impressive example of a piece of military historiography' (Todman, 2005 p117), achieving audience ratings of almost three and a half million, as well as reviews in every national newspaper the next day (Todman, 2005). Critically, the reaction was positive albeit confused; the viewing public however were not happy, the programme 'highlighting and questioning myths that had become so established……….met with little acceptance' (Todman, 2005 p117). Some found the programme offensive, in fact 'it led to the military historian Gary Sheffield receiving hate mail for his role as a defender of Haig' (Todman, 2005 p118). Strangely though, little attention seems to be given to the events of the Hundred Days campaign, which began on the 8th August 1918 at the Battle of Amiens, referred to by Ludendorff as, '...the black day of the German Army in the history of the war' (Terraine, 2005 p458), and continued relentlessly up until the hour the armistice came into effect. That 'Haig played a crucial role in shaping the events of the Hundred Days' (Harris, 1998 p300) and, that 'it is difficult to imagine the war coming to an end in 1918 without his influence' (Harris, 1998 p300-301), appear to be ignored and are instead over shadowed by casualty figures. Although one cannot overlook Haig's role in the disastrous first day of the Somme (Prior and Wilson, 1991), should we not also remember that Britain, with Haig as Commander-in-Chief, and her allies won the First World War?

The popular, modern day reputation and public perception of Haig therefore seem to be based upon a distorted interpretation of the First World War and more profoundly, the man himself, but why and when did this change occur?

Those Who Held Sway

The hostilities between the belligerent nations of the First World War ended at 11am on the 11th November 1918 with the Armistice. In Britain however, hostilities between generals and politicians, which started as soon as Britain declared war and focused primarily upon how the war should be conducted, did not, and instead intensified, entering the public domain and changing focus. They became concerned with reputations rather than strategy; more specifically, who should receive the acclaim for victory and who should take the responsibility for any failure (Mead, 2007; Reid, 2006; Todman, 2005). Amongst the first to enter this melee was Sir John French, whose memoirs, 1914, were published in 1919; closely followed by other high ranking generals, such as Sir William Robertson and Sir Ian Hamilton. Unfortunately, this public war of words started by the generals, had pitched them 'against two of the most articulate and vituperative British politicians of the twentieth century, Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George' (Todman, 2005 p88).

During his lifetime Haig never publicly engaged in this war of words, choosing instead to remain aloof, however this does not mean that he took no action in order to defend himself. He instead chose, as highlighted by David French, 'to do so privately or to encourage others to do so on his behalf' (French, 1985 p954). A good example of this being the publication in 1922 by Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston, Haig's private secretary, and G.A.B. Dewer, a journalist and former war correspondent, of Sir Douglas Haig's Command, December 19, 1915 to November 11, 1918. The book portrayed Lloyd George 'not as the man who won the war but as an ignorant and mendacious political intriguer who meddled in military matters he did not understand….' (French, 1985 p957-958); and the conduct of the war by the generals as a necessary means to achieving victory (Todman, 2005).

Winston Churchill publicly entered the war of words in 1923 when he published the first volume of The World Crisis; in the preface he hoped that those who read the book would 'feel that perhaps after all Britain and her Empire have not been so ill-guided through the great convulsions as it is customary to declare' (Churchill, 2005 pxvi). A further five volumes, the last being an abridgement of the first four, were published over the next eight years, covering the entire span of the conflict, with particular dominance given to instances during the war that he had been personally involved in; Gallipoli and tanks to name but two (Bond, 2002). The volumes made a significant impact; not only were they written by a former Cabinet minister who played several major roles in the war but they 'also made extensive use of official documents not generally available to historians until the mid-1960s' (Bond, 2002 p43); for this reason they were regularly utilised by other historians in their work.

Volume Three, The World Crisis: 1916-1918, deals specifically with the fighting on the Western Front and is dominated by the Somme; 'from beginning to end a welter of slaughter...' (Churchill, 2005 p667) and Passchendaele; 'Ceaselessly the Menin gate of Ypres disgorged its streams of manhood' (Churchill, 2005 p729). It is this volume that is most critical of the generals and their relentless pursuit of trench warfare, something Churchill experienced personally whilst serving as a colonel in a Scottish battalion in early 1916 (Churchill, 2005). He argued passionately against the effectiveness of attrition; at the time making several critical speeches in Parliament which were later published as The Fighting Line, (Churchill, 2005) and then later, using an analysis of the casualty figures to come to the conclusion 'that Britain and France had consistently suffered more severely than Germany' (Bond, 2002 p44).

Churchill's main military advisor for this work was Edmonds; however he did seek other views and in fact sent early draft copies to Haig (Reid, 2006; Todman, 2005), who made slight alterations which Churchill accepted, but on the whole Haig viewed the comments as fair and balanced (Todman, 2005);

> '....as a country gentleman on the soil which his ancestors had trod for generations, and to whose cultivation he had devoted his life. But the Great War owned no Master; no one was equal to its vast and novel issues; no human hand controlled its hurricanes; no eye could pierce its whirlwind dust clouds.........the fact remains that no other subject of the King could have endured the ordeal which was his lot with the phlegm, the temper, and the fortitude of Sir Douglas Haig.' (Churchill, 2005 p653-654).

> He even exonerated Haig for Passchendaele, laying the blame squarely at the feet of Robertson, who 'drifted ponderously' whilst Haig 'acted from conviction' (Churchill, 2005 p729-730). Although seemingly moderate in his overall criticism of Haig, Churchill, who was after all a passionate historian, albeit one who sought to exonerate himself, had with this work set a precedent by which Haig and the generals, were to be judged: 'the great offensives of 1916 and 1917 were described as futile...; the generals were depicted as reactionary in their attitude to tanks....; and, above all, his powerful analysis of casualty statistics provided evidence for generations of critics that Haig's attritional strategy had been misconceived.....' (Bond, 2002 p44-45).

Lloyd George's entrance into the arena to join the public war of words occurred much later than his contemporaries due to his continuing political career, however when he did, his War Memoirs, published in six volumes between 1933 and 1936 with an abridged cheaper two volume edition in 1938, were to prove the most critical and damaging to the generals reputations on the Western Front. In the foreword of the latter two volume edition he wrote,

> 'I aim to tell the naked truth about War as I saw it from the conning-tower at Downing Street. I saw how the incredible heroism of the common man was being squandered to repair the incompetence of the trained inexperts.....in the ghastly butchery of a succession of vain and insane offensives.' (Lloyd George, 1938 pv-vi).

He assembled an impressive team of advisers, including the eminent military historian of the period Captain Basil Liddell Hart, and claimed that the basis of his evidence was 'a vast number of memoranda, minutes and letters concerning the War and Peace, all written at the time' (Lloyd George, 1938 viii).

Included within this 'naked truth' were also his opinions and support in respect to the pacifist movements of the period, movements which had been spawned by the growing fears of another conflict in Europe; in 1933 the Oxford Union passed a resolution that 'This house will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country' (Todman, 2005 p134); and the Peace Pledge, signed by millions, stating that they would not fight in any future wars, to name but two (Todman, 2005). His message of 'war is crude, uncertain and costly' (Lloyd George, 1938 pviii), spoke volumes for their cause, with his reflections upon the current climate of the period reinforcing their depiction of war as a 'wasteful exercise that solved nothing' (Todman, 2005 p134).

However Lloyd George's real reasons for writing his memoirs lay else where; money, but more importantly vindication and revenge; 'Every volume of memoirs, or every biography, of a leading politician or soldier that appeared was anxiously scanned by Lloyd George's assistants for any derogatory references to their chief...' (Mead, 2007 p369). The prime targets were the generals, the most significant being Haig; a fact highlighted in the two volume edition by the index alone, which consists of over two pages of entries for him, with the majority being uncomplimentary of course; 'his reputation founded on cavalry exploits; failure of his strategy at the Somme; insists on

premature use of tanks; prefers rather to gamble with men's lives than admit an error; admits futility of Passchendaele; painstaking but unimaginative' (Lloyd George, 1938 p2073-2075).

Lloyd George's most vicious attack on Haig appears in chapter LXIII. Here, eighty seven pages, broken down into seven sub sections, with titles such as; 'Continuation of Deliberations: Misrepresentations to the Government'; and 'The Four Months' Battle for a Fraction of the Objective' (Lloyd George, 1938 pxi); vilify not only Haig but the entire high command for the roles they played in the Third Ypres campaign, more commonly referred to by Lloyd George as Passchendaele. He portrays them as unwilling to learn, as going against the politicians and of slaughtering thousands of their own troops for no apparent gain (Todman, 2005). In the latter two volume edition, he includes as an appendix, 'a very considerable number of letters from officers and men who took part in the Passchendaele Campaign………who confirm my opinion as to the utter stupidity of prolonging the struggle….' (Lloyd George, 1938 p1342-1364). According to Bond, Lloyd George 'devoted a special effort to the prosecution case in the Passchendaele campaign because he saw this as crucial in shaping the British people's memory of the Great War' (Bond, 2002 p46). He sought to vindicate himself for his own lack of action in a disastrous campaign which he ultimately, as Prime Minister, had the power to stop (Prior and Wilson, 1996), and therefore by pointing the finger of blame at the high command, more importantly Haig, it was them and not he who became 'stigmatized indelibly' (Bond, 2002 p48) with the images of Passchendaele; mud, blood and slaughter. Later in life, Lloyd George, when questioned about his War Memoirs, revealed that he had had no notes or diaries on the Passchendaele campaign and that he dictated the whole episode whilst on a golfing holiday in the Algarve (Reid, 2006 p7).

The 1960s and the Birth of the 'Donkeys'

During the late 1940s and early 1950s public interest in the First World War became eclipsed by the recently concluded Second World War and the subsequent publication, due to relaxed paper rationing, of its main events and the memoirs of its leading figures (Todman, 2005). By the late 1950s however the amount of material available for publication on the Second World War was almost exhausted, but the public's thirst for military history was not (Todman, 2005). Publishers and authors alike, sensing this

and no doubt in recognition of the imminent approach of the fiftieth anniversaries, due to fall between 1964 and 1968, turned their attention once more to the earlier conflict, initiating a revival of the history of the First World War (Bond, 2002). Access to any new records or information was however still restricted under the fifty year rule and therefore the sources for carrying out this revival were primarily those that had been produced between the wars, notably Churchill, Lloyd George and Liddell Hart. In using these sources though they were not only reviving the history of the war but also reviving the controversies that existed within it (Todman, 2006). In addition to this, unlike these earlier authors, the new ones would be able to write about the war more freely. In part due to the period itself, but more importantly because of the removal of the moral restriction placed upon the authors of the inter war period; the emotions of the bereaved parents, who by the 1960s were virtually all dead (Todman, 2005).

The 1960s was a turbulent decade; 'a period of social change, of the questioning of traditional values and mores' (Sheffield, 2004 p71); and it was to be within this context then, that the revival of the history of the First World War was to be carried out and carried out in such a way that it was to shape the modern day public perception of not only the First World War but more importantly, the reputation of the generals.

Throughout the 1960s the predominant fear was that of all out nuclear war, a fear that was almost bought to fruition in 1962 by the Cuban missile crisis, when the world stood on 'the brink of annihilation' (Bond, 2002 p51). Response to this fear, in the late 1950s, was in the form of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), whose influence was to peak during the early 1960s (Bond, 2002); the movement no doubt initiating the resurrection of the anti-war beliefs of the 1930s. On the world stage, American involvement in Vietnam was to fuel still further the disdain of war and of the military that had begun to develop in Britain. In Europe these feelings erupted into violent clashes with the authorities, whilst in Britain the reaction was more subdued but was highlighted by the emergence of a radical student body (Bond, 2002). Finally, on a social level, encouraged by high wages, cheap goods and hire purchase agreements, Britain, in the 1960s, entered the modern consumer age, and due to a more liberal outlook, particularly in regards to matters of a sexual nature, heralded the birth of an independent youth culture (Bond, 2002; Todman, 2005). The overall predominance within the decade was undoubtedly that of an anti-war nature, an issue reflected within

the revival of the history of the First World War by the anti-war atmosphere of the 1930s, and therefore an issue that would dominate the tone in which the 1960s would judge the First World War.

The book that was the 'prototype and a portent' (Danchev, 1991 p265) for the revival of the history of the First World War was, In *Flanders Fields*, by Leon Wolff, published in 1958. In describing the conditions at Passchendaele, Wolff 'introduced the horrors of the Western Front to a new generation…satiated with a decade of accounts of how Monty had beaten the Desert Fox and knocked him for six out of Africa' (Bond, 2002 p59). His portrayal of war was different then to what his audience was used to; his method and style, painting word pictures that revealed a tragedy, a tragedy that 'appeared less inevitable than predictable, and hence avertable' (Danchev, 1991 p267). If this tragedy was avertable, then why did it continue and who was to blame? The high command, more importantly Haig was to blame; 'the futile offensive should have been stopped but it dragged on into November mainly due to Haig's obstinacy' (Bond, 2002 p59). His final conclusion, in line with the anti-war atmosphere of the 1930s, was ultimately to set the fashion for how the First World War would now begin to be remembered; 'the war had meant nothing, solved nothing and proved nothing' (Bond, 2002 p59-60).

It was however the work of Alan Clark, backed by two influential giants of the 1930s; Liddell Hart and Lord Beaverbrook, that was to provide the greatest imposition in regards to Haig and his fellow generals, with his book, published in 1961, *The Donkeys*. The title, becoming the final epitaph of those who commanded the British Expeditionary Force was taken from a quote Clark attributed to the German, General Hoffman when he described in a conversation with Ludendorff the British army 'as lions led by donkeys' (Clark, 1961 p9). The book focuses on the battles of the Western Front during 1915, stating in the introductory note that 'This is the story of the destruction of an army – the old professional army of the United Kingdom…..machine-gunned, gassed and finally buried in 1915' (Clark, 1961 p11). His view of most officers above the rank of captain was that they were 'grossly incompetent……and that Haig, in particular, was an unhappy combination of ambition, obstinacy and megalomania' (Danchev, 1991 p268). His attack on Haig was further supported by his misuse of quotes, the most memorable being in regards to him being more concerned with George V falling from his horse

than with the fate of his army (Clark, 1961). The military historian Michael Howard after reading the book said it was entertaining but that as history, especially in regards to those who fell, it was a 'pretty deplorable piece of work' (Reid, 2006 p10). However the book sold well and was to influence a great many, both then and now, in their depiction of Haig and the generals. Some years after Clark had written *The Donkeys,* he was pressed to say when and where General Hoffman had described the British soldiers as 'lions led by donkeys'; he eventually admitted that he had made it up (Corrigan, 2003; Holmes, 1999; Ramsden, 2002; Todman, 2005).

The most celebrated and perhaps most influential historian of the period was A.J.P. Taylor. His 1963 publication, *The First World War: An Illustrated History*, is believed to be 'the most widely read historical work on the war as a whole in the English language' (Danchev, 1991 p263). Like others of the period he criticised the generals and their strategy, 'The British went on battering to no purpose' (Taylor, 1963 p62) but like Churchill, agreed that the war owned no master, 'When they gave up, the Germans battered in their turn, to equally little purpose' (Taylor, 1963 p62). His criticism of Haig was however a little harsher, 'Third Ypres was the blindest slaughter of a blind war' (Taylor, 1963 p148). Perhaps though the most important conclusion that he came to, and the one that most people would adhere to, was that the First World War was not 'a good war' like the Second, but an utterly senseless one' (Danchev, 1991 p273).

Criticism of the war was also evident within popular entertainment, the most well known being Joan Littlewood's Theatre Workshop production *Oh What a Lovely War,* which opened at the Theatre Royal, Stratford, London in 1963 (Todman, 2005). Based on three popular historical texts of the period; August 1914, and the works mentioned previously by Clark and Wolff, the play portrayed the First World War as a futile conflict. However the play had a serious political side which was evident from the authors' notes in the theatre programme (Bond, 2002).

'In 1960 an American Military Research Team fed all the facts of World War One into the computers they use to plan World War Three. They reached the conclusion that the 1914 war was impossible and couldn't have happened. There could not have been so many blunders nor so many casualties. Will there be a computer left to analyse World War Three?' (Todman, 2005 p137).

The play carried the message of a previous holocaust to a new generation, which in 1962 had almost had their own.

The generals did however have a stout defender during the 1960s, in the form of John Terraine, who in the words of Sheffield 'emerged as the principal enemy of the instant historians' (Sheffield, 2004 p71). Terraine sensing the implications of mass media during the 1960s sought to take on the instant historians on their own ground, through books, newspapers and television, rather than through the academic route and in doing so managed to maintain that those who wanted a different perspective could find one (Sheffield, 2004).

His most opportune moment came in 1963, when he was recruited by the BBC to be a scriptwriter on the biggest documentary series ever to be made in Britain, *The Great War* (Danchev, 1991). The series, due for release in 1964 to coincide with the launch of BBC 2 and the fiftieth anniversary of the war, was made up of twenty six parts which would cover all aspects of the conflict. Terraine, alongside other revisionists, sought to use the series in order to defend the reputation of the generals; this however led to a clash with the series military adviser Liddell Hart, who resigned before the airing of episode thirteen, on the Somme (Bond, 2002; Todman, 2005). Each episode had an enormous impact, with viewing figures reaching on average eight million people (Danchev, 1991), however the impact was not the one that Terraine had envisaged; 'the devastating chapters on Verdun, the Somme and Passchendaele tore myself and some friends to shreds…' (Ramsden, 2002 p17). Or as one housewife was to put it, 'this series should be seen by all to bring home the horrors of war and the dreadful waste of young manhood' (Danchev, 1991 p280-281). The message, albeit unintended, was anti-war,

> 'But with the added impact of the moving pictures and the size of television audiences by the 1960s, and with the embedding of its apparent message in a view that was also emerging at the time……..the effect on the popular perception of the Great War would this time be deeper and far more lasting.' (Ramsden, 2002 p17-18).

The series from Terraine's point of view was intended to defend the reputation of the army and the generals against those who sought to besmirch them; it in fact did the opposite and helped to condemn them. At Haig's former Oxford College, Brasenose, the war memorial by the entrance was removed and his portrait was embossed with a new caption, "Murderer of One Million Men" (Bond, 2002 p54).

Conclusion

According to Taylor the Somme 'set the picture by which future generations saw the First World War: brave helpless soldiers; blundering obstinate generals; nothing achieved. After the Somme men decided that the war would go on forever' (Taylor, 1963 p99-105). This imagery of the Somme therefore reflects the imagery needs of the 1960s and not the true happenings of the First World War. Yes there was slaughter, but slaughter on both sides. The distortion of the history of the First World War and as a consequence the distorted view of Haig, was smuggled unknowingly out of the 1930s and was reborn out of this need to only portray the negative aspect of war. Surely by now this negative image of the war should be reassessed in order to once and for all salute honourably those who lost there lives in a conflict that they believed was right. And is it not time also that Haig was looked upon for his achievements as Commander-in-Chief rather than his mistakes but also as the man who helped create the British Legion, and as the founder of Poppy Day.

REFERENCES

BADSEY, S. (2002) 'The Great War Since The Great War'. *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 22 (1), pp37-45.

BOND, B. (2002) 'The Unquiet Western Front' *Britain's Role in Literature and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHURCHILL, W. S. (2005) *The World Crisis, 1911-1918*. Abridged and Revised Edition New York: Free Press.

CLARK, A. (1961) *The Donkeys*. London: Hutchinson.

CORRIGAN, G. (2003) *Mud, Blood and Poppycock*. London: Cassell.

CURTIS, R., ELTON, B and LLOYD, J. (1989) *Blackadder: The Whole Damn Dynasty 1485-1917*. London: Penguin.

DANCHEV, A. (1991) 'Bunking' and Debunking: The Controversies of the 1960s'. In Bond, B. (ed.) *The First World War and British Military History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

FRENCH, D. (1985) 'Sir Douglas Haig's Reputation, 1918-1928: A Note'. *The Historical Journal*, 28 (4), pp953-960.

HARRIS, J. P. (1998) *Amiens to the Armistice*. London: Brassey's.

HOLMES, R. (1999) *The Western Front*. London: BBC Worldwide.

LAFFIN, J. (1988) *British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One 1*. Gloucester: The History Press.

LLOYD GEORGE, D. (1938) *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George Volume I and II.* London: Odhams.

MEAD, G. (2007) *The Good Soldier: The Biography of Douglas Haig*. London: Atlantic Books.

PRIOR, R and WILSON, T. (1991) 'Summing Up the Somme'. *History Today,* Vol.41, pp37-43.

PRIOR, R and WILSON, T. (1996) *Passchendaele: the untold story*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

RAMSDEN, J. A. (2002) 'The Great War: the making of the series'. *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 22 (1), pp7-19.

REID, W. (2006) *Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig*. Edinburgh: Birlinn.

SHEFFIELD, G. (2002) *The Western Front: Lions Led by Donkeys?* BBC History, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/lions_donkeys_01.shtml

SHEFFIELD, G. (2004) 'John Terraine as a Military Historian'. *RUSI Journal,* 149 (2), pp70-75.

TAYLOR, A. J. P. (1963) *The First World War: An Illustrated History*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

TERRAINE, J. (2003) *The Western Front 1914-1918*. Barnsley: Pen and Sword.

TERRAINE, J. (2005) *Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier*. London: Cassell.

THE TIMES ONLINE, Courtesy of Birmingham Libraries available online @ http://web6.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/381/101/21905156w16/purl=rc1_T

TODMAN, D. (2005) *The Great War: Myth and Memory*. London: Hambledon Continuum.

TODMAN, D. (2006) *World War One: Misrepresentation of a Conflict,* BBC History, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/perceptions_01.shtml

WIEST, A. A. (2005) *Haig: The Evolution of a Commander*. Washington D.C: Potomac Books.

Health, Beauty and Fashion Magazine Exposure, on Women's Body Image, Mood and Self-Esteem and Whether Body Mass Index has a Mediating Effect

Kayley Walker

ABSTRACT

The current study assessed whether images of female magazine models have an effect on females' body image, mood and self-esteem, and whether body mass index (BMI) has a mediating influence on the effects of magazine images. Female undergraduate students viewed a slide show of 20 representative magazine images featuring female models. They completed questionnaires on body image, mood and self-esteem, along with reporting their BMI. A mixed (between - BMI, within – magazine exposure) MANOVA analysis revealed that BMI and magazine exposure had an impact on females' body image, mood and self-esteem. The implications of these findings are discussed.

KEYWORDS

Body image, Mood, Self-esteem, Magazine impact, BMI.

Introduction

Today, society places much emphasis on being thin, especially towards young women (Ramirez, 2007). Women are constantly being surrounded by society's cultural norm of beauty, in magazines, on television, and across billboards (Ramirez, 2007). According to Schooler et al (2004) the ideal woman is often described as being tall, exceedingly thin and blonde, an ideal that is unattainable for most females. The media's increasing emphasis on thinness as a characteristic of beauty has been widely studied; much of this research suggesting that exposure to the unrealistic assumptions of attractiveness has harmful effects on women (e.g. Stice et al., 1994; Owen and Laurel-Seller, 2000; Schooler et al., 2004; Thomsen et al., 2002; Jung, 2006; Ramirez, 2007).

Much research (e.g. Bessenoff, 2006; Owen and Laurel-Seller, 2000) has suggested that the media's endorsement of thinness being the ideal has negative effects on women psychologically. The majority of the research focuses on women's body image (e.g. Ramirez, 2007), mood (e.g. Jung, 2006; King and Manaster, 1977), and self-esteem (e.g. Salem and Elovson 1993). Television (TV) viewing and magazine reading behaviours are the two forms of media that are commonly used to examine the media's impact on women (e.g. Harrison and Cantor, 1997; Tiggeman, 2003; Vaughan and Fouts, 2003). Research suggests that both forms have a negative psychological impact on women (e.g. Ayers et al. 2006; Tiggemann, 2003). However, studies have suggested that magazine reading behaviour may have a more negative effect on women than other forms of media exposure (e.g. Harrison and Cantor, 1997; Tiggeman, 2003; Vaughan and Fouts, 2003). This is most worrying as the 'National Magazine Company' (2008) alone is viewed by 13.5 million adults a year, the majority of these viewers being female.

It has long been agreed that females are more at risk of being affected by the media than males (e.g. McCarthy, 1990; Anderson and DiDomenico, 1992). The majority of research studying media's effects on women has used college students, as this population is most associated with eating disorders (Cohen, 2006). However, other studies (e.g. Robins, et al., 2002; Cohen, 2006) have suggested that older age has a mediating influence on the effect of media exposure.

BMI has recently been studied as a mediating factor of the effects of magazine images on women (Strauss, 1999). It is suggested that women with high BMI will be more negatively affected by magazine images of slender models, than women with low BMI, as they do not match the 'thin-ideal' presented in the media (Strauss, 1999).

The impact of magazine exposure on body image, mood and self-esteem

Much research has suggested that exposure to magazine images of 'thin and attractive' models has a negative effect on women's body image (e.g. Morry and Staska, 2001; Ahern and Hetherington, 2005; Bessenoff, 2006). Groesz, Levine and Murnen (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of 25 studies examining the effects of media exposure (TV and magazine) on body image. The results indicated that positive body image

significantly decreased after viewing 'thin-ideal' media images, compared to after viewing images of either 'average' or 'plus-size' models, or images containing no models. Similarly, Morry and Staska (2001) reported that participants who exposed themselves to magazines frequently had greater concerns about their physical appearance than those who expose themselves less often to magazines.

Magazine exposure has also been suggested to have a negative effect on women's mood (e.g. McCarthy, 1990; Leora et al., 1999). McCarthy (1990) reported that women are twice more likely to become depressed than men. They hypothesized that this is due to two possible pathways. First, the belief that the 'thin-ideal' presented in the media is important, may place some women at risk of depression. Secondly, women who fail to reach the 'thin ideal' by means of dieting will develop lowered self-esteem, and will be at risk of depression via helplessness. McCarthy (1990) therefore suggested that cultures which have a 'thin-ideal' will have more women with depression. This is supported by Leora et al (1999) who studied the impact of 'thin-ideal' images on women's mood states. Participants (n=118) were randomly assigned to two groups, the control group (n=67) and the experimental group (n=51). The control group viewed 20 images containing no human figures, whereas the experimental group viewed 20 images containing female fashion models. After the slide show all subjects completed a questionnaire assessing their mood. The results found that women in the experimental group were more depressed following exposure to 'thin-ideal' images. Similar findings were reported by Stice and Shaw (1994), and Halliwell and Dittmar (2004) who suggested that exposure to 'ultra-thin' models increases women's feelings of depression, shame, guilt and insecurity.

Self-esteem is another psychological area that is frequently studied when dealing with the media's impact on women (e.g. Hargreaves and Tiggemann, 2002; Jones and Buckingham, 2005). Research has found media exposure of 'slender and attractive' models to have a negative effect on women's self-esteem (e.g. Jones and Buckingham, 2005).

Hargreaves and Tiggemann (2002) conducted a study in which 195 female adolescent participants viewed either 20 'appearance-related' commercials or 20 'non-appearance-related' commercials. The results indicated that in female participants the viewing of appearance commercials was related to increased negative mood and body dissatisfaction, and decreased self-esteem.

The effect of BMI on body image, mood and self-esteem

Psychological constructs of body image, mood and self-esteem have also been found to be related to a person's BMI (e.g. Allon, 1982; Strauss, 1999; Matz et al, 2002; Tiggemann, 2003). BMI is the ratio of weight (in kilograms) to height (in meters) squared (Dohnt and Tiggemann, 2006). According to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2008) people with a BMI of around 25 have an ideal weight for their height.

Much research has indicated that women with a low BMI are less likely to be negatively effected by media images of attractive models than women with high BMI (e.g. Allon, 1982; Strauss, 1999; Matz, 2002; Tiggemann, 2003). McLaren, Hardy and Kuh (2003) have reported that BMI is perhaps the most consistent associate of body image dissatisfaction in women. They conducted a longitudinal study of 933 women. Participants provided height and weight data, at ages 7, 11, 15, 20, 26, 36, 43 and 54 years. The findings revealed that women who were dissatisfied with their bodies were more likely to have had a higher BMI throughout their life, compared to women who were satisfied with their bodies.

This was supported by Strauss (1999) who conducted a longitudinal study of 1,520 children. The results indicated that by age 13 being over-weight was found to be negatively correlated with having low self-esteem in White and Hispanic children. This finding was stronger in girls. The significant change that came with age may be explained by the children's increased awareness of socio-cultural pressures to be thin (Ahern and Hetherington, 2005). The aim of the current study was to investigate the impact of health, beauty and fashion magazine exposure on female student's body image, mood and self-esteem and to examine whether BMI has a mediating effect.

Methodology

Sample and Procedure

A convenience sample of 47 (mean age 24, SD = 7.46 years) female, undergraduate students was recruited from a university within Birmingham, between February and March 2008. Eighty-nine percent of this sample was Caucasian. Of the 47 participants

invited to partake in this study, 38 (81%) completed all research activities. The participants were divided into two groups those with high BMI and those with low BMI. The cut off point for low BMI was 25, as according to WHO (2008) a BMI of 25 is ideal. BMI was the chosen measure for the current study as it is less intrusive than other methods of measuring body fatness. Fourteen (37%, mean age = 27, SD = 8.98) participants had high BMI, compared with 24 (63%, mean age = 22, SD = 6.03) participants with low BMI. Prior to data collection, ethical approval from the institutional review board was obtained and the British Ethical Guidelines (BPS, 2008) were adhered to.

Participants completed self-report questionnaires on body image, mood and self-esteem along with reporting their BMI (e.g. time 1). Two weeks later participants viewed a slide show of 20 representative magazine images featuring female models. Each image was displayed for 30 seconds and participants completed a task which ensured they were attending to the stimuli. Post-magazine exposure (e.g. time 2), participants re-completed the body image, mood and self-esteem questionnaires. To reduce priming effects a counterbalanced design was used.

Design

The design of this study was quasi-experimental (regression-discontinuity) design with a repeated measure, and between-subject variable. The between-subject variable was BMI and the within-subject variable was exposure of magazine images. Both of these had two levels (high or low BMI, and pre or post-exposure of magazine images). There were also three dependant variables being measured; body image, mood, and self-esteem.

Materials

Body image was assessed using Stunkard et al's (1983) 'Figure Rating Scale'. This is a nine-point scale depicting nine images of different sized women, ranging from very slim to very fat. Participants were asked to indicate their current body size and their ideal body size. A low score indicated high body image satisfaction. The maximum score achievable was 8 and the lowest score achievable was 0.

Mood was assessed using Watson, Clark and Tellegen, (1988) 'Positive and Negative Affect Scale' (PANAS), this questionnaire was chosen for its high internal consistency (Crawford and Henry, 2004; Watson, Clark and Tellegen 1988). The PANAS consists of 20 questions, using a five-point likert scale, measuring positive and negative moods. Participants were asked to indicate their mood by identifying how often they experienced a range of 10 positive moods (e.g. excited, interested etc.) and 10 negative moods (e.g. scared, hostile etc.) in the last week. Positive mood was marked on a scale of 0 (slightly/not at all agree) to 4 (extremely agree), and negative mood was marked on a scale of 0 (extremely agree) to 4 (slightly/not at all agree). A high overall score indicated high positive mood.

Self-esteem was assessed using Rosenberg's (1965) 'Self-Esteem Scale'. This scale was chosen as it is frequently cited in similar studies (e.g. Clay, Vignoles, and Dittmar, 2005). This scale is comprised of 10 questions each using five-point likert scales. Participants were asked to circle the answer that best indicated how much they agreed with a selection of self-esteem statements. All statements were scored on a scale that ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree. A high score indicated a high level of self-esteem.

Stimuli

The stimulus used in this study was a PowerPoint slide show of 20 representative magazine images depicting female models. Five magazines with a wide circulation were chosen. 85 images were selected from these magazines as they were full colour images, showing at least two-thirds of the model. From this sample 20 images were randomly selected to make the PowerPoint slide show.

Statistical Analysis

A mixed (between-within) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to assess the impact of BMI and magazine exposure on female student's body image, mood and self-esteem. MANOVA is used to analyse data from designs with at least two dependant variables and at least one factor (Brace, Kemp and Snelgar, 2006). MANOVA was ideal for this study, as it had three dependant variables (body image, mood and self-esteem) and two independent variables.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Body image dissatisfaction increased between pre- and post-exposure of magazine images for women with low BMI (mean = 0.42, SD = 0.50; mean = 0.67, SD = 0.56 respectively) and women with high BMI (mean = 1.93, SD = 1.07; mean = 2.07, SD = 1.26 respectively) (Table I).

Table I. A table to show the descriptive statistics for the effect of BMI and magazine exposure on body image.

Time	Body mass index	Mean	Std. Deviation	n
Body image at time one (pre exposure)	Low	.42	.50	24
	High	1.93	1.07	14
	Overall	.97	1.05	38
Body image at time two (post-exposure)	Low	.67	.56	24
	High	2.07	1.26	14
	Overall	1.18	1.11	38

Higher body image scores indicate greater body image dissatisfaction.

Positive mood decreased between pre- and post exposure of magazine images for participants in the low BMI group (mean = 49.92, SD = 12.98; mean = 49.54, SD = 12.04 respectively) and for participants in the high BMI group (mean = 52.36, SD = 12.21; mean = 51.14, SD = 13.12 respectively) (Table II).

Table II. A table to show the descriptive statistics for the effect of BMI and magazine exposure on mood.

Time	Body mass index	Mean	Std. Deviation	n
Mood at time one (pre-exposure)	Low	49.92	12.98	24
	High	52.36	12.21	14
	Overall	50.82	12.59	38
Mood at time two (post-exposure)	Low	49.54	12.04	24
	High	51.14	13.12	14
	Overall	50.13	12.30	38

Higher mood scores indicate greater positive mood.

Self-esteem decreased between pre- and post-exposure of magazine images for participants in the low BMI group (mean = 26.58, SD = 5.86; mean = 26.25, SD = 6.63 respectively). However, self-esteem increased between pre- and post-exposure of magazine images for participants in the high BMI group (mean = 26.86, SD = 7.58; mean 27.29, SD = 7.89 respectively) (Table III).

Table III. A table to show the descriptive statistics for the effect of BMI and magazine exposure on self-esteem.

Time	Body mass index	Mean	Std. Deviation	n
Self esteem at time one (pre-exposure)	Low	26.58	5.86	24
	High	26.86	7.58	14
	Overall	26.68	6.45	38
Self esteem at time two (post-exposure)	Low	26.25	6.63	24
	High	27.29	7.89	14
	Overall	26.63	7.03	38

High self-esteem scores indicate greater self-esteem.

MANOVA results
The effect of BMI on body image, mood and self-esteem

The MANOVA result suggests that women's BMI had a significant effect on their body image, mood and self-esteem combined (F (3, 34) = 11.280; p = .000, Partial Eta Squared = .499) (Table IV).

The effect of magazine exposure body image, mood and self-esteem

The MANOVA result suggests that exposure to representative magazine images of female models has a significant and large effect on women's body image, mood and self-esteem combined (F (3, 34) = 3.069; p = .041, Partial Eta Squared = .213) (Table IV).

The interaction effect of magazine exposure and BMI on body image, mood and self-esteem

The interaction effect of BMI and magazine exposure was not significant (F (3, 34) = .298; p = .826; Pillai's Trace = .026; Partial Eta Squared = .026). This result suggests that the interaction between magazine exposure and BMI did not have a significant effect on body image, mood and self-esteem combined (Table IV).

Table IV. A table to show the main effect of BMI and exposure of magazine images on the combination of the dependant variables and their interaction effect on the combination of dependant variables

Effect	Variable	Variable type	Pillai's trace value	F value	Df	Sig	Partial Eta Squared
Main effect	BMI (high and low)	Between-subject	.499	11.280	3,34	.000	.499
Main effect	Magazine exposure (pre- and post exposure)	Within-subject	.213	3.069	3,34	.041	.213
Interaction effect	BMI and exposure	Both	.026	.298	3,34	.826	.026

Discussion

Overall evaluation of the results

The results of the MANOVA indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between pre- and post-exposure of media images on the combined dependant variables. Thus suggesting that exposure to media images of female models will affect women's body image, mood and self-esteem. There was also a significant difference between high and low BMI on the combination of the dependant variables. However, the interaction effect was not significant; this implies that BMI has no mediating influence of how women are affected by magazine images of female models.

The impact of magazine images on women's body image, mood and self-esteem

The current study implies that magazine exposure of female models does significantly affect women's body image, mood and self-esteem, thus supporting previous literature that suggests that the unrealistic assumptions of attractiveness portrayed in the media has harmful effects on women (e.g. McCarthy, 1990; Groesz, Levine and Murnen, 2001; Ahern and Hetherington, 2005; Clay, Vignoles and Dittmar, 2005; Jung, 2006; Ramirez, 2007). Ramirez (2007) suggests that these harmful effects are produced by women not being able to attain the 'thin ideal'.

The descriptive statistics indicate that all women were negatively affected for the variables of body image and mood (Tables I and II). However women with low BMI were affected differently to women with high BMI for the variable of self-esteem. Self-esteem decreased between pre- and post-exposure of magazine images for participants in the low BMI group (mean = 26.58, SD = 5.86; mean = 26.25, SD = 6.63 respectively) but increased between pre- and post-exposure of magazine images for participants with high BMI (mean = 26.86, SD = 7.58; mean 27.29, SD = 7.89 respectively), suggesting that magazine exposure had a negative effect on self-esteem in people with low BMI and a positive effect on self-esteem in people with high BMI (Table III).

The impact of BMI on women's body image, mood and self-esteem

The results indicated that BMI had a significant and large effect on the combination of dependent variables, supporting previous literature that suggests women with high BMI will be less satisfied with their body and so exhibit greater negative mood and lower self-esteem (e.g. Strauss, 1999; McLaren, Hardy and Kuh, 2003).

The descriptive statistics indicated that women with low BMI had a lower body dissatisfaction than women with high BMI at baseline (pre-magazine exposure). Suggesting that prior to magazine exposure women with low BMI were more satisfied with their bodies than women with high BMI.

The descriptive statistics for the effect of BMI on mood indicated that at baseline (pre-exposure), women with low BMI had a slightly lower positive mood than women with high BMI, suggesting they had a more negative mood than women with high BMI. This suggests that prior to magazine exposure women with low BMI had a greater negative mood than women with high BMI. This contrasts with previous literature that suggests that people with high BMI will exhibit a greater negative mood than people with low BMI (Strauss, 1999).

Similarly, the descriptive statistics for the effect of BMI on self-esteem indicated that women with low BMI had lower self-esteem than women with high BMI at baseline. Suggesting that prior to magazine exposure, women with high BMI had greater self-esteem than women with low BMI. This contrasts with previous literature in the area that suggests that people with higher BMI will be less self confident (e.g. Allon, 1982) because they conform less to society's standards of beauty, than women with low BMI (Salem and Elovson, 1993).

However, one possible explanation for these contrasting result is that the age differences between women in the low (mean age = 22, SD = 6.03) and high (mean age = 27, SD = 8.98) BMI group had an influence. This is supported by Robins et al (2002), who suggested that age has a mediating effect on women's mood and self-esteem.

The interaction effect of BMI and exposure to magazine images on women's body image, mood and self-esteem

The interaction effect suggests that the variables of magazine exposure and BMI acting in unison on body image, mood and self-esteem was not significant (p = .826). However, this may be explained by the result that self-esteem decreased after exposure to the magazine images for women in the low BMI group, but self-esteem increased after exposure to magazine images for women in the high BMI group (Table III). The results therefore suggest that BMI does not have a mediating influence over the effect of magazine images on women's body image, mood and self-esteem.

Conclusion

It was concluded that representative magazine images of female models do have a significant effect on women's body image, mood and self-esteem combined. Similarly, women's BMI also has a significant effect on these three variables combined. However, the interaction effect was not significant, suggesting BMI has no mediating influence on how women are affected by representative magazine images of female models.

One of the limitations of this study was small sample size (n = 38). According to Pallant (2004), a small sample size may lead to a type 2 error (failure to reject the null hypothesis when it is false). To try and counter this, the Pillai's Trace test results were reported from the MANOVA. According to Tabachnic and Fidell, (2001, cited in Pallant, 2004) this test is best used when there is a small sample size and unieven N values, as in this case. Another limitation was that the participants were collected by the means of opportunity sampling. This method of sampling can produce a biased sample, as this population may have different qualities to the general population, therefore the results may not be representative (Kohanski, 2006). Also, the variable of age was not taken into account and may have had an influence on the results.

The use of BMI as a measure of body fatness also has limitations. Prentice and Jebb (2001) argue that BMI is only a surrogate measure of body-fatness, as obesity is defined as an excessive accumulation of body fat, which BMI scores can not measure accurately.

The design of this study was a quasi-experimental design. Quasi-experimental studies have been reported to have less internal validity than a randomised experiment (Trochim, 2006) as they lack random allocation of participants to conditions (Coolican, 2004). To counter this limitation the quasi-experimental regression-discontinuity (RD) design was used. In RD designs, participants are assigned to groups solely on the basis of a cut-off score (in this case BMI scores) (Trochim, 2006). Trochim (2006) has suggested that due to RD designs' cut-off criterion, the conclusions drawn from them are comparable in internal validity to randomised experiments. However, a further limitation of RD designs is that the cut-off score is subjective.

Also, although an interval of two weeks was implemented to counter any participant priming effects, this may not have been sufficient. The timing of the administration of the self-report questionnaires may also have had an influence on the results, as much of the data was obtained near the end of term, and participants may have been experiencing stressors such as exams. In addition, as the majority of the data was collected during February and March, these results may not be representative of women's mood and self-esteem throughout the year. The current study was also a short-term study. Short-term studies have been criticised as they can not establish that observed effects will be constant over time (Cohen, 2006).

The attrition rate of the study may also indicate that there was a flaw in the design, as almost 20% of the participants that filled in the initial questionnaire failed to complete the second questionnaire.

Recommendations for the future

To make the results of this study easier to generalise to wider populations, a random sample design could be implemented. Random sampling arguably allows for every individual in a target population an equal probability of being selected (Coolican, 2004). Future research could focus on how magazine images effect different ethnicities, especially Asian and Oriental women, as fewer models of these ethnicities are presented in magazines. Furthermore, a useful extension to the current study would be to assess the participants' socio-cultural attitudes. As the results of the current study suggested that women with low BMI had lower positive mood and lower self-esteem than women with high BMI, they contrasted with previous literature in the area (e.g. Allon, 1982; McLaren, Hardy and Kuh, 2003; Strauss, 1999). One explanation for this finding is that women with low BMI placed more importance on being 'thin' and conforming to the media's unrealistic ideals of attractiveness than participants with high BMI (Ahern and Hetherington, 2005).

REFERENCES

ARCHBISHOPS' COUNCIL (2006) AHERN, A.L. and HETHERINGTON, M.M. (2005). 'The thin ideal and body image: An experimental study of implicit attitudes. *Psychology of Addictive Behaviours*. 20(3):338-342.

ALLON, N. (1982). 'The stigma of overweight in everyday life'. In WOLDMAN B.B (Ed.), *Psychological aspects of obesity* (pp. 130–174). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

ANDERSON, A.E. and DIDOMENICO, L. (1992). 'Diet vs. Shape Content of Popular Male and Female Magazines: A Dose–Response Relationship to the Incidence of Eating Disorders?' *International Journal of Eating Disorders.* 11(3) pp 283-287.

AYERS, B., GROGAN, S. and FORSHAW, M. (2006). 'The effects of advertisements portraying sender women on women's body image: An intervention study'. *Division of Health Psychology Conference*, University of Essex, September 13-15t.

BESSENOFF, G.R. (2006). 'Can the media affect us? Social comparison, self-discrepancy, and the thin ideal'. *Psychology of Women Quarterly.* 30(3) pp 239-251.

BRACE, N., KEMP, R. and SNELGAR, R. (2006). *SPSS for psychology: Versions 12 and 13.* 3rd Ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

British Psychological Society (BPS). (2008). *Ethical principles for conducting research with human participants: Introduction to the revised principles.* [Online] Available at <http://www.bps.org.uk/ethics> (Accessed: 15/01/2008).

CLAY, D., VIGNOLES, V.L. and DITTMAR H. (2005). 'Body image and self-esteem among adolescent girls: Testing the influence of sociocultural factors'. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*. 15(4) pp 451-477.

COHEN, S. B. (2006). 'Media exposure and the subsequent effects on body dissatisfaction, disordered eating and drive for thinness: A review of the current research.' *Mind Matters: The Wesleyan Journal of Psychology.* 1 pp 57-71.

COOLICAN, H. (2004). *Research methods and statistics in psychology.* 4th Ed. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

CRAWFORD, J.R. and HENRY, J.D. (2004). 'The positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS): Construct validity, measurement properties and normative data in a large non-clinical sample'. *British Journal of Clinical Psychology.* 43 pp 245-265.

DOHNT, H. and TIGGEMANN, M. (2006). 'The contribution of peer and media influences to the development of body satisfaction and self esteem in young girls: A prospective study'. *Developmental Psychology*. 42(5) pp 929-936.

GROESZ, L.M., LEVINE, M.P. and MURNEN, S.K. (2001). 'The effect of experimental presentation of thin media images on body satisfaction: A meta-analytic review'. *International Journal of Eating Disorders*. 31(1) pp 1-16.

HALLIWELL, E. and DITTMAR, H. (2004). 'Does size matter? The impact of model's body size on women's body-focused anxiety and advertising effectiveness'. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology.* 23(1) pp 104-122.

HARRISON, K. and CANTOR, J. (1997). 'The relationship between media consumption and eating disorders'. *Journal of Communication*. 47 pp 478-500.

HARGREAVES, D. and TIGGEMANN, M. (2002). 'The effect of television commercials on mood and body dissatisfaction: The role of appearance schema activation'. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*. 21(3) pp 287-308.

JONES, A.M. and BUCKINGHAM, J.T. (2005). 'Self-esteem as a moderator of the effects of social comparison on women's body image'. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*. 24(8) pp 1164-1187.

JUNG, J. (2006). 'Media influence: Pre- and postexposure of college women to media images and the effect of mood and body image'. *Clothing and Textiles Research Journal*. 24(4) pp 335-344.

KING, M.R and MANASTER, G.J. (1977). 'Body image, self-esteem, expectations, self-assessment, and actual success in a stimulated job interview'. *Journal of Applied Psychology.* 62(5) pp 589-594.

KOCHANSKI, G. (2006). *Statistical Sampling.* [Online] Available at <http://kochanski.org/gpk/teaching/0401Oxford/sampling.pdf> (Accessed: 25/04/2008).

LEORA, P., TONER, .B., GARFINKEL, P.E. and STUCKLESS, N. (1999). 'The effects of the ideal of female beauty on mood and body satisfaction'. *International Journal of Eating Disorders.* 25(2) pp 223-226.

MATZ, P.E., FOSTER, G.D., FAITH, M.S. and WADDEN, T.A. (2002). 'Correlates of body image dissatisfaction among overweight women seeking weight loss'. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*. 70(4) pp 1040-1044.

McCARTHY, M. (1990). 'The thin ideal, depression and eating disorders in women'. *Behavioural Research and Therapy*. 28(3) pp 205-215.

McLAREN, L., HARDY, R., and KUH, D. (2003). 'Women's Body Satisfaction at Midlife and Lifetime Body Size: A Prospective Study' *Health Psychology*. 22(4) pp 370-377.

MORRY, M.M. and STASKA, S.L. (2001). 'Magazine exposure: Internalisation, self-objectification, eating attitudes, and body satisfaction in male and female university students'. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*. 33(4) pp. 269, 11 pgs.

National Magazine Company (2008). *About NatMag.* [Online] Available at <http://www.natmags.co.uk/. (Accessed: 22/01/2008).

OWEN, P.R. and LAUREL- SELLER, E. (2000). 'Weight and shape ideals: Thin is dangerously in'. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*. 30(5) pp 979-990.

PALLANT. J. (2004). *SPSS Survival Manual*. 2nd Ed. New York: Open University Press.

PRENTICE, A.M. and JEBB, S.A. (2001). 'Beyond body mass index'. *Obesity Review*. 2(3) pp 141-147.

RAMIREZ, X.A. (2007) 'Thin is in: An analysis of media endorsed ideals of physical attractiveness and their affects on college-age women' *Unpublished thesis: Boston College* [Online] Available at <http://www.bc.edu/schools/cas/ communication/meta-elements/pdf/thesis07.ramirez.pd.> (Accessed: 20/12/2007).

ROBINS, R.W., TRZESNIEWSKI, K.H., TRACY, J.L., GOSLING, S.D. and POTTER, J. (2002). 'Global self-esteem across a life span'. *Psychology and Ageing*. 17(3) pp 423-434.

ROSENBURG, M. (1965). *Society and the Adolescent Self-Image*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

SALEM, S.K. and ELOVSON, A,C. (1993). 'Importance of ideal body image, self-esteem and depression in females'. *Paper presented at the 101st annual convention of the American Psychological Association* (1993).

SCHOOLER, D., WARD, M., MERRIWETHER, A. and CARUTHER, A. (2004). 'Who's that girl: Television's role in the body image development of young white and black female'. *Psychology of Female Quarterly.* 28(1) pp 38-47.

STICE, E., SCHUPACK- NEUBERG, E., SHAW, H.E. and STEIN, R.I. (1994) ' Relation of media exposure to eating disorder symptomatology: An examination of mediating mechanisms'. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology.* 103(4) pp 836- 840.

STICE, E. and SHAW, H.E. (1994). 'Adverse effects of the media portrayed thin-ideal on women and linkage to bulimic symptomatology'. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology.* 13(3) pp 288-308.

STRAUSS, R.S. (1999). 'Childhood obesity and self-esteem: Electronic article'. *Pediatrics*. 105(1) p 15.

STUNKARD, A.J. SORENSON, TI SCHULSINGER, F. (1983) Use of the Danish Adoption Register for the Study of Obesity and Thinness. New York: Raven Press.

THOMSEN, S.R., McCOY, J.K., GUSTAFSON, R.L. and WILLIAMS, M. (2002). 'Motivations for reading beauty and fashion magazines and anorexic risk in college-age women. *Media Psychology*. 4(2) pp 113-135.

TIGGEMAN, M. (2003). 'Media exposure, body dissatisfaction, and disordered eating: Television and Magazines are not the same!' *European Eating Disorders Review*. 11(5) pp 418-430.

TROCHIM, W.M.K. (2006). 'Statistical analysis of the regression-discontinuity design'. *Research Methods: Knowledge Based.* [Online] Available at <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/>.

VAUGHAN, K.K. and FOUTS, G.T. (2003). 'Changes in television and magazine exposure and eating disorder symptomatology.' *Sex Roles.* 49(7-8) pp 313-320.

WATSON, D., CLARK, L.A., and TELLEGEN, A. (1988). 'Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 47 pp 1063-1070.

World Health Organisation (WHO). (2008). *'Global Database on Body Mass Index: BMI classification'*. [Online] Available at <http://www.who.int/bmi/ index. jsp?introPage=intro_3.html>. (Accessed: 22/01/2008).

Eclectic Approach to Modern Drama

Vicki Taylor

ABSTRACT

This work is written with the argument that an eclectic approach to modern drama is more useful and appropriate than the work of any lone individual. It takes into consideration a number of various twentieth century practitioners including Stanislavski, Chekhov and Brecht and analyses their approaches in the light of each other.

This work discusses and debates the effectiveness of each of the individual practitioners during the era of modern drama and explains the characteristics of each of their approaches and analyses them in detail, introducing fresh arguments as the work progresses.

Through linking theories and practices, the work suggests where and how theories could be used in modern society drama and how it was used during the twentieth century period and compares its usefulness accordingly.

KEYWORDS

Modern Drama, Stanislavski, Brecht, Eclecticism, Practitioners.

Introduction

When using drama in today's society many different approaches could be deemed as useful, however it is often difficult to analyse which approach is most useful. In this essay the many approaches towards theatre from the twentieth century modern drama will be analysed in order to discover which practitioner/director's approach to theatre is most useful when used in drama today, particularly when approaches are used in conjunction with plays which are popular in today's society.

Stanislavsky's psychotechnique (Mitter, 1992, p.6) is a series of activities based on units and objectives, given circumstances, and emotion memory. 'Significantly, both the

'given circumstances' exercise and the study of objectives are, at different points in the Stanislavsky corpus, construed as being the most productive starting points for work on a production' (Mitter, 1992, p.13). By developing character, the style of theatre is more realistic. This results in the audience becoming more involved in the play and allows them to develop an ability to sympathise and empathise with the characters on stage.

This technique develops characterisation and helps the actor better understand their character and what feelings, emotions, and thought processes go with the actions. 'An action is meaningful only if it is real, and reality is a function of reason' (Mitter, 1992, p. 6). Therefore, the action is developed throughout the thought process of the actor, rather than the action determining the thought process. Actors perform from exploring the experiences of the character rather than mimicking actions. The focus is on what the character actually thinks, rather than just what they do. However, this technique can focus too much on characterisation and therefore it can be time consuming. Stanislavsky divided his psychotechnique into six parts.

> In the first stage, the actors get to know the author's work. In the second stage they search for the psychological material needed to represent their characters. In the third stage, they create imaginary models of their characters. Only in the fourth stage are these images realised in the body. (Mitter, 1992, p.14).

Stanislavsky's psychotechnique is useful in today's drama as it can be used as a guide to assist actors in building their characters and understanding the intentional aspects of the play. This can be achieved through the method of given circumstances, which the playwright has included within the stage directions, mise-en-scene and dialogue between characters. However, to solely rely on Stanislavsky's psychotechnique alone would limit the effect in which a play may have on its audience, particularly through its subtext.

Where Stanislavsky's psychotechnique is useful in some ways, it is a hindrance in other ways. If a director was to choose to instruct their actors to direct through Stanislavsky's psychotechnique, the result would be a play which is mainly naturalistic. This is great if that was how the play was originally intended to be. However, if a director applied Stanislavsky's psychotechnique to a Brechtian play, such as Fear and Misery of the Third Reich, (Brecht, 1983) much of the key aspects of the play would not be expressed

and therefore would be lost to most audience members. For example, in scene two of Fear and Misery of the Third Reich (Brecht, 1983) the man, during an argument concerning the actions of the SA (brown shirts in Hitler's Nazi Regime) against their neighbour states, 'They didn't have to rip it though. Our sort isn't that well off for clothes.' (Brecht, 1992, p.2)

If this scene was performed using Stanislavsky's psychotechnique the political undercurrent wouldn't be uncovered and therefore the audience would perceive the scene as a simple argument and this line would be understood to be relating purely to the couple's economic status as a 'lower-middle-class' family. However, through the use of Brecht's montage and using an image of Germany with this particular line, it provides the audience with a third perception suggesting that the line refers to more than just the couple's economic state and well-being, but also that of Germany's.

This is caused due to Brecht's use of subtext which is best displayed through the use of techniques such as montage, not…but, and gestus; three of the techniques which are often associated with Brecht and Epic theatre, (Walter, 1984, p.24). Therefore, for political plays with deeper subtextual meanings, it would be more efficient and useful to focus more on Brecht's styles of theatre rather than Stanislavsky's but *without* ignoring techniques used by Stanislavsky as these benefit actors with their characterisation.

In the same way that Stanislavsky uses his psychotechnique, Meyerhold puts his actions into units and objectives, which he called biomechanics (Styan, 2002). He cuts down his actions into small chunks because each aspect of an action has to have a specific purpose. Meyerhold 'attempted to relate acting to the new machine age and the new political order. By emphasising physical training rather than inspiration or psychological insight, Meyerhold claimed that acting could be made available to a far broader segment of the population' (Carlson, 1984, p.357).

The actions have more meaning because Meyerhold breaks the actions down to build them back up again to make the actions stronger and more meaningful and symbolic. This technique began to alienate the audience because they could not see themselves in the role of the characters as there was too much emphasis on the action and not enough on the characters themselves. Because the exaggerated movements were not naturalistic, the audience were not able to empathise with the characters as easily as

they could if Stanislavsky's method was used, however, Meyerhold condemned 'the naturalistic theatre for leaving nothing to the audience's imagination and distracting from the actor,' (Carlson, 1984, p. 320) who Meyerhold believed should always be 'the principle element in the theatre.' (Meyerhold, 1978, p.32)

If a scene from Brecht's version of *Mother Courage and her Children* (Willett, 1959) was performed using Meyerhold's biomechanics, some aspects of the visual representation of the characters could be effective. In this particular version of *Mother Courage and her Children*, Brecht directs the actor who performs the role of Mother Courage to swing her leg whilst riding on her cart. This would be very successful under Meyerhold's methodology of theatre as the actor could break down each swing of the leg to hold a separate intention and meaning. However, this particular movement is also successful under Brecht's use of gestus as it suggests that Mother Courage is tough as she is kicking her leg and therefore it holds attitude within the action. It would be most effective, therefore, if the two methodologies were used together to create a strong sense of attitude held within the action and therefore would have more of an impact on the audience.

However, if the production of a play was based purely on Meyerhold's biomechanics, the audience would become very bored as there would be too much emphasis on the actions of the characters rather than a plot or storyline for the audience to follow.

After witnessing the effectiveness and importance of focusing more on the physical actions of a character as well as on the psychological states through Meyerhold's work, Stanislavsky decided that he would have to adapt and change his ideas, 'A consistent feature of this change from the cerebral to the physical is that the physical is preferred solely because is it more effective,' (Mitter, 1992, p.24). The idea of focusing more of physical actions results in rehearsing being much more focused on experimenting and experimental theatre was very useful in the period of modern drama.

This particular aspect of Stanislavsky's ideas was later known as his method of physical actions which were a 'series of physical actions interlaced with one another. Through them we try to understand the inner reasons that give rise to them ... the logic and consistency of feelings in the given circumstances of the play. When we can discover that line, we are aware of the inner meaning of our physical actions.' (Mitter, 1992, p.24). Therefore Stanislavsky had flipped his original ideas and had now developed his theories to suggest that actions lead to feelings which lead to thought rather than the other way around.

However, despite Stanislavsky believing that physical actions were important he never discarded of his psychotechnique theories as he believed that;

> It is impossible to build a character only with the body. Thoughts and emotions are essential in building a functioning individual. But we cannot underestimate the importance of training an actor's body. The body provides a great deal of information through visual transmission. (Neelands and Dobson, 2000, p.91)

Therefore, Stanislavsky was keen to associate the two parts of his methodology and use them together to create, what he believed, would be an effective production. However, despite the effectiveness of all of his ideas, the use of Stanislavsky's work would not be very effective on plays such as *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* (Brecht, 1963) which have aspects of thought processes displayed throughout the production. The most effective methodology to use to effectively portray these thought processes would be Brecht's not…but which prolongs the action within a scene by suggesting not this way, but that.

Vakhtangov adapted the ideas of both Stanislavsky and Meyerhold as he 'felt that Stanislavsky was too attached to naturalism and missed the significance of theatricality in the theatre, whilst Meyerhold's fascination with stylised physicality had led him to ignore the importance of feelings' (Hodge, A. 2000, p.82) which was important for Vakhtangov and led him to put the two methodologies together to achieve a style of theatre which was considered both 'live' and 'theatrical' (Cole and Chinoy, 1963, p.185-191).

Vakhtangov 'unified the two diametrically opposed systems: that of psychological realism and graphic expressionism – through gesture, movement and sound. What evolved was to be known as 'fantastic realism', (Orani, 1984, p.463). This is useful as this approach contained the strengths of both Stanislavsky and Meyerhold's works and therefore was thought to be most effective. However, this approach still failed to uncover subtext meanings within plays unless Austin's (1970) 'three types of utterances: locution, illocution, and perlocution' were analysed separately and additionally to this approach which would help the actor to discover what is truly meant by the words of the character. Therefore, if Vakhtangov's approach to theatre was used for a Brechtian play, the politics would not be addressed by the audience in their viewing of the play.

In the *Caucasian Chalk Circle* (Brecht, 1963) where the servant, Grusha, is panicked by her actions a 'Stanislavskian actor will focus on [the servant] and see 'only the things seen by the character residing within him'. [Whereas the] Chekhovian actor… will focus on the [other] characters and observe how [they] respond to the [servant],' (Hodge, 2000, p.81). This suggests that Michael Chekhov would approach theatre from the perspective of characters which come in contact with the actor's character rather than purely focusing on their character alone. This is useful in developing character relationships but may not develop the feelings and emotions of the characters themselves.

Chekhov 'established the use of the 'Psychological Gesture'. This is when the 'actor physicalizes a character's need or internal dynamic in the form of an external gesture. He then mutes the outward gesture and incorporates it internally, allowing the physical memory to inform the performance on an unconscious level,' (answers.com). This is useful in developing a particular movement or gesture of a character and consequently the actor would have to think carefully about their character's thoughts and feelings in order to do this.

Chekhov was against Stanislavsky after 1918 in terms of 'Stanislavsky's use of personal experience and emotion [because it] binds the actor to the habits of the everyday self which was not the way to liberate the actor's creativity,' (Hodge, 2000, p.81). Chekhov argued that an actor should consider the character's feelings and emotions rather than their own. This is because if a character is too similar to an actor then the character becomes too realistic and therefore unbelievable. Instead, an actor should create a separate character from themselves and therefore experiences different feelings and emotions.

Due to Brecht's 'central concern [being] the theatre's social and political dimension', (Carlson, 1984, p.382) he included a lot of subtextual political meanings throughout his plays. *In Fear and Misery of the Third Reich* (Brecht, 1983), Brecht uses many aspects of political subtext to help to illustrate the complicity of life in the society of the Third Reich in Germany. In scene thirteen, 'Workers Playtime', the workers at a pro-German factory are being interviewed as propaganda for the radio. If a director was to focus mainly on Stanislavsky's psychotechnique on this scene, the characters would seem

to be enjoying their jobs and it would seem naturalistic and therefore it would be much more difficult to understand the purpose of the scene. However, if you focused more on the actions within the scene by using approaches such as Stanislavsky's method of physical actions or Meyerhold's biomechanics, the characters would emphasise the movements too much and consequently would take away the intended social and political meanings which are held within the scene. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to use Brecht's techniques of gestus, not…but and montage to display the subtextual meanings to the audience. However, for plays which are intended to be naturalistic such as Strindberg's *Miss Julie* (Strindberg, 1998), Brecht's approach to theatre would not be useful whereas Stanislavsky's approaches would be more helpful to the actors, such as when the character is washing up, in silence, at the beginning of the play.

'Not…but' is the structure of a sentence which compromises a simple alienation,' (Mitter, 1992, p.60). In Brecht's version of *Mother Courage and Her Children* (Brecht, 1995), the character Mother Courage prolongs her decision of whether to sell her cart or not by suggesting that the character of Mother Courage is contemplating the amount to sell her cart by. The effect that this has on the audience is that it causes them to become frustrated with the character for not choosing the option which they wish the character to choose. This sustains the audience's attention whilst simultaneously alienating them.

''Gestus' of which 'gestisch' is the adjective, means both gist and gesture; an attitude or a single aspect of an attitude, expressible in words or actions,' (Willett, 1964, p.42). Gestus therefore is used to express attitude within an action such as the character of Mother Courage pulling her cart as she leads herself into the darkness at the end of the play in Brecht's version of Mother Courage and Her Children. Through using gestus, Brecht wanted to make 'visible or accessible knowledge about the world which might otherwise be invisible or at least inaccessible,' (Muir, 1996, p.9). The use of gestus therefore, is key in the effectiveness of uncovering hidden subtext within plays, particularly those concerning the political concerns of the modern world.

Gestus was used by Brecht as an 'expression of the social relationship that exists between people. But additionally, Brecht wanted this gestus to contain a contradiction'

(Neelands and Dobson, 2000, p.106) In Brecht's version of *Mother Courage and Her Children* (Brecht, 1995), Brecht uses gestus quite frequently. The most effective use of gestus within this play is the silent scream which makes the audience feel uncomfortable as Mother Courage is unable to express her true feelings. Due to the audience being unable to reason her actions, they become alienated from the action through the gestus. 'Gestus functions to keep always, before the spectator, the social implications of epic theatre,' (Carlson, 1984, p.384).

Montage was used by Brecht to influence the audience in making a third meaning from two images or stimuli which usually, but not always, contrasted against each other. In a lecture about the use of montage on the 23rd April 2007 well-known captions such as 'Home Sweet Home' were used within a scene where there was domestic violence. This type of contrasting montage encourages the audience to create a third meaning from the two stimuli such as the fact that there is more to home than its sweetness. Eisenstein (1974) took montage and used it within films which he produced such as *Battleship Potemkin* which was observed in a lecture on the 26th March 2007 in which there was a shot of a pair of glasses followed by a shot of the same pair of glasses which were shattered with blood pouring from them. This allows the audience to presume that a shooting has taken place without the actual action being witnessed. The desired effect that montage has on an audience is that they are constantly alienated by the production because they are constantly made to criticise and make judgements.

The most shocking approach to theatre in modern drama was Artaud's theatre of cruelty in which the action was 'played in the round and [the stage was] stacked with theatrical devices and flashing lights; music came from every corner of the house' and blackouts would enable the actors to creep around the audience in complete darkness so that it would be successful in startling all of the senses in every member of the audience.

This type of theatre was 'Artaud's ideal theatre [where] there would be no written play, only improvisation upon a theme' (Styan, 1981, p.126) so that each time a performance was on it would be different than ever before. Therefore, this theatre approach would not be suitable for a scripted play such as *Fear and Misery of the Third Reich* (Brecht, 1983) or another of Brecht's plays.

'Absurdist plays fall within the symbolist tradition, and they have no logical plot or characterization in any conventional sense… The absence of plot serves to reinforce the monotony and repetitiveness of time in human affairs,' (Styan, 1981, p.126). This causes the audience to become confused as they search for a purpose and meaning from what is being shown to them and consequently causes frustration when there is none as the 'characters lack motivation found in realist drama, and so emphasize their purposelessness,' (Styan, 1981, p.126). This approach to theatre is very useful for general entertainment and for encouraging the audience to make judgements and decisions for themselves. In Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*, Godot is never actually met and therefore it remains unclear to the audience what or who Godot is and therefore is open to interpretation.

Brecht's work is very useful for students today; however, the most effective production would involve bits of Stanislavsky and Brecht as Stanislavsky's more naturalistic methodology 'encourages the spectator to become engulfed in the plot, to accept it as an unalterable linear development of experience' (Carlson, 1984, p.383). Whereas Brecht's epic theatre alienates and 'distances the spectator, presents its action as alterable, and forces the spectator to consider other possibilities and to judge between them,' (Carlson, 1984, p.383). Therefore through Brecht's methodology, the audience would become more alienated due to the use of gestus montage, and not…but, which would create more of an expressionist and symbolised experience for the audience. Whereas in Stanislavski, the audience would have a much more realistic experience and therefore would be more emotionally connected to the play. Arguably, these methods could be as important as each other. However, if the director kept switching vigorously between the two methods, the audience would be emotionally connected to the play, but at the same time realise that it is not necessarily all truth because it is theatre and theatre is a story. Therefore, to conclude, the most efficient and useful approach to theatre today would be to use an eclectic approach taking the most effective parts of all of the approaches and using them where they are best suited.

REFERENCES

AUSTIN, J. (1970) *How to do things with words*. Edited by J. O. Urmson. New York: Oxford University Press.

BRECHT, B. (1983) B*ertolt Brecht collected plays / edited by John Willett and Ralph Manheim*. Vol.4. Pt.3, Fear and misery of the Third Reich. London: Methuen.

BRECHT, B. (1995) *Collected plays / Bertolt Brecht ; translated by John Willett ; edited and introduced by John Willett and Ralph Manheim. 5, Life of Galileo ; Mother Courage and her children.* London: Methuen Drama.

BRECHT, B. (1963) The *Caucasian chalk circle / translated by James and Tania Stern with W.H. Auden.* London: Eyre Methuen.

BRECHT, B. (translated by Willett, John) (1992) 'The street scene' in Bentley, E. (ed.) The theory of the modern stage. London: Penguin Books, pp.85-96.

BRECHT, B. (translated by Willett, John) (1992) 'On experimental theatre' in BENTLEY, E. (ed.) *The theory of the modern stage*. London: Penguin Books, pp. 97-108.

CARLSON, M. (1984) *Theories of the Theatre.* USA: Cornell University.

DRAIN, R. (1995) *Twentieth Century Theatre.* London: Routledge.

EISENSTEIN, S. (1974) The complete films of Eisenstein, together with an unpublished essay by Eisenstein / translated by John Hetherington. London: Weidendteld and Nicolson.

HODGE, A. (2000) *Twentieth Century Actor Training.* Oxen: Routledge.

LECTURE BY KATAFIASZ, K. based on *Realism to Alienation* on 26th March 2007

LECTURE BY KATAFIASZ, K. based on *Modernism* on 23rd April 2007

MEYERHOLD, V. (1978) 'The Naturalistic Theatre and the Theatre of Mood', in *Meyerhold on Theatre.* London: Methuen Drama. pp.32

MITTER, S. (1992) *Systems of Rehearsal.* Oxen: Routledge.

MUIR, A. (1996) *New Beginnings*. Staffordshire: Trentham Books Limited.

NEELANDS, J. and DOBSON, W. (2000) *Theatre Directions*. Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton.

ORANI, A. (1984) 'Realism in Vakhtangov's Theatre of Fantasy', *Theatre Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 4, p.463

STRINDBERG, A. (1998) *Miss Julie, and other plays / August Strindberg ; translated with an introduction and notes by Michael Robinson.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

STYAN, J. L. (1981) *Modern drama in theory and practice 2.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

STYAN, J.L. (2002) *Modern drama in theory and practice 3.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

VAKHTANGOV (1922) 'Fantastic Realism', in Cole and Chinoy (1963), pp.185-191

WALTER, B. (1984) 'What is Epic Theatre?', *SCYPT journal*, 13, pp.24-34.

WILLETT, J. (1959) *The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht*. London: Methuen and Co Ltd.

WILLETT, J. (1964) *Brecht on Theatre.* London: Eyre Methuen.

www.answers.com/chekhov viewed on 2nd June 2007

The Failure of US Diplomacy: Alexander Haig and the Falklands Crisis of 1982

Jonathan Atherton

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to discover why US Secretary of State Alexander Haig's shuttle diplomacy failed to resolve the Falklands crisis of 1982. Following recent trends in the development of the historiography of the Falklands issue, the Haig mission is not discussed in isolation but considers the wider political context in both Britain and Argentina in the lead up to the Falklands crisis. Whilst not un-critical of Haig's mediation attempt, I have found that the failure of diplomacy was inevitable. Argentina and Britain's opposing claims of sovereignty and self-determination were totally incompatible. A diplomatic settlement could only be reached if either or both sides were willing to compromise. The political situation in Argentina and Britain made compromise impossible as both governments had their very future dependent on the outcome of the Falklands Crisis.

Introduction

On 2nd April 1982 Argentina invaded one of the last remnants of British colonial rule, the Falklands / Malvinas islands located some eight thousand miles from main land Britain. This was greeted by an incandescent British response and the commencement of a military operation, the scale of which had not been seen since the Second World War.

The world's reaction was initially one of disbelief. The US state department at first regarded the escalation of the Falklands conflict with a combination of bemusement and amusement, describing it as 'A Gilbert and Sullivan battle over a sheep pasture between a choleric old John Bull and a comic dictator in a gaudy uniform,' (Haig, 1984 p266).

Such attitudes were quickly forgotten when the very seriousness of the situation became apparent. The UN passed resolution 502 demanding a complete withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands, setting in motion the beginning of serious diplomatic attempts to resolve the Falklands crisis. This was to culminate in President Reagan offering the assistance of the United States to help negotiate a resolution to the dispute. On 7th April it was announced that US secretary of state Alexander Haig would serve as mediator in an attempt to find a diplomatic settlement. By the 30th April Haig announced that he had failed.

Since 1982 there has been considerable debate between historians in trying to explain the failure of the Haig mission. Early interpretations blamed the failure of diplomacy upon Argentine intransigence (Calvert, 1982b) or Haig himself, (Gavshon and Rice, 1984). A criticism of these studies is that they focus on the Haig mission largely in isolation, without taking into account the wider political context. More recent developments in the historiography have taken into account the political situation in Britain and Argentina, but this has not necessarily furthered our understanding of why the Haig mission failed. A popular interpretation considers 'national honour' as the primary explanation as to why a diplomatic settlement could not be reached, (Kinney, 1989). Indeed a variant of this interpretation has appeared in the most recent publication on the Falklands crisis, (Gibran, 2008). It seems difficult to see how the failure of diplomacy can be attested to a concept as vague and intangible as that of national honour. Clearly this subject requires further study.

The purpose of this article is to attempt to provide a detailed explanation as to why Haig's shuttle diplomacy failed. The article will, in line with recent developments in the historiography not consider the Haig mission in isolation, but will provide an extensive examination of the wider political considerations of both Britain and Argentina. Thus, having provided a brief background to the dispute, the first chapter examines Argentine and British politics in the lead up to the Falklands War, detailing the various internal and external pressures faced by Galtieri and Thatcher. This serves to illustrate how important the Falklands conflict was to their own political survival. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the process of the Haig mediation attempt, which critically analyses the role of Britain, Argentina and the US in the failure of diplomacy, a conclusion then sums up my arguments as to why the Haig mission failed.

British and Argentine politics and the Falklands crisis.

The dispute between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands can be traced back to 1833 when two British warships ejected a small contingent of Argentines from the islands. The conflicting legal claims to the islands made since then are not wholly transparent. Britain's claim to the islands is based on their discovery by English navigators in the sixteenth century, having continuous possession of the islands for one hundred and fifty years and on self-determination, the fact that the islanders clearly wish to remain British, (Richardson, 1996). Argentina's claim to the islands is based on their belief that discovery is an inadequate basis for sovereignty, that Argentina inherited the islands from Spain, Britain seized the islands through an act of piracy and that Argentina should own the islands on the basis of territorial proximity, (Boyce, 2005). In reality neither side has a conclusive claim to the islands in the eyes of international law, (Richardson, 1996).

Whilst Britain had been in continuous possession of the islands since 1833, the issue of the sovereignty of the islands had been a constant consideration in Argentine foreign policy. This controversy was to become more prevalent during the mid 1960's. Lord Carrington recalls that since that point 'every British government had needed to face it to some degree,' (Carrington, 1988 p348). The years of negotiation between Britain and Argentina had been an equal source of frustration for both sides, (Beck, 1988). Ironically the British and Argentine perceptions towards the Falklands islands were on the surface compatible with a settlement that would return the islands to Argentina. Whilst Argentina cherished the idea of reclaiming the Malvinas, the British regarded them as an anachronistic imperial burden, (Calvert, 1982a). What stopped an agreement being reached was that the islanders were adamant they wished to remain British, (Richardson, 1996). Whilst it would have been possible to reach an agreement with Argentina without their consent, this was regarded as too politically sensitive to attempt, (Green, 2006).

Argentina's decision to invade the Falkland islands can be traced back to General Galtieri's coming to power in December 1981. The military Junta in Argentina had been in power since 1976 and can be best characterised as economically incompetent,

(George, 1984). Since the Junta had come to power Argentina had suffered no less than three financial crises, which led to an uncontrollable balance of payments deficit and soaring unemployment. Galtieri's accession to power coincided with a deepening recession, (Dabat and Lorenzano, 1984). Galtieri was thus faced with the unenviable task of restoring legitimacy to the state already heavily eroded by economic mismanagement and facing continuing economic hardship, (George, 1984).

In the opinion of some members of the Argentine Junta the best way of restoring legitimacy was the re-establishment of Argentine rule over the Malvinas. Indeed, no goal has had greater salience in Argentine foreign policy than the Malvinas. There exists a genuine feeling that the country will remain less than whole until the Malvinas are returned to international rule, (Gompert, 1985).

Galtieri's coming to power was heavily dependent on the backing of Admiral Anaya, head of the Argentine Navy, who was passionately keen on retaking the islands and deeply frustrated by negotiations with Britain that had thus far yielded nothing, (Marr, 2007). It seems that Anaya offered Galtieri his full political and military support on the understanding that the navy would be able to expand its plans for occupation of the Malvinas, (Burns, 1987).

Argentine aspirations towards the Malvinas were to an extent aided by confused British foreign policy, (Beck, 1988). The 1981 Strategic Defence Review removed the ice patrol vessel HMS *Endurance* from service on the Falklands. Whilst the *Endurance* had limited military capabilities it did provide the islands with a 'symbolic' defence against aggressors. Its removal served to signify to Argentina that Britain was no longer prepared to defend the Falklands, (Calvert, 1982b). Indeed the British embassy noted that in Argentina a number of national newspapers described the withdrawal of *Endurance* as a sign of Britain's abandoning the protection of the Falkland islands, (Green, 2006). This perception was shared by the Argentine Junta, (Seldon and Collings, 2000). Even the Franks report, which was not critical of the British government described the decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* as 'inadvisable' in light of the developing Argentine political situation, (Coates, 2001 p78).

Therefore with Galtieri's coming to power it appears that a military operation to retake the Malvinas was inevitable. The events of early 1982 however accelerated this process.

Galtieri's economic policies had some limited success (Torre and De Riz, 1993) but were insufficient to prevent widespread economic discontent. During March 1982 Galtieri was faced with a resurgence of demonstrations that took place throughout the country. These demonstrations illustrated just how widespread opposition to the Junta had become as they were made up of people from all levels of society, (George, 1984). In the words of one commentator, Argentina was 'on the brink of serious convulsion, due to unrestrained corruption and calamitous economic policy,' (Dabat and Lorenzano 1984 p75).

The decision to invade was only made shortly before the invasion itself. Originally scheduled for June, Galtieri sanctioned the invasion at the end of March. This decision was taken in the context of a worsening of the economic crisis, contradictions within the armed forces, apparent decreasing British interest in defending the Falklands and as the mass protests had demonstrated, great advances in mass movement and struggle for democracy in Argentina, (Dabat and Lorenzano 1984).

By April 1982 the British government, obvious differences with the Junta not withstanding, found itself in a markedly similar predicament. Thatcher's coming to office in 1979 coincided with a downturn in the British economy and Thatcher sought to tackle these problems with radical economic policy. During the 1979 budget the Thatcher government attempted to instigate economic recovery by reducing inflation through the control of money supply and cutting income tax to stimulate the private sector, (Evans, 1997). These policies were unable to reverse the economic slump. The 1980 budget was even more radical, introducing the medium-term financial strategy which aimed to reduce inflation by decreasing monetary growth, whilst also preventing high interest rates by decreasing government borrowing, (Seldon and Collings, 2000). The 1980 budget achieved its deflationary ambitions with spectacularly grim effect and by the end of that year Britain was entering a deep recession.

Thus, the Argentine invasion of the Falkland islands offered the prospect of foreign policy humiliation to add to the government's domestic woes, (Green, 2006). Thatcher's first reaction to the invasion was 'we have to get them back', (Thatcher, 1993 p179). This was due to the fact that Thatcher knew politically to cave in would finish her, (Marr, 2007). The foreign office faced considerable criticism from within the Conservative party and in the media. This culminated in the resignation of foreign secretary Lord Carrington on 6th April. Thatcher's main priority was to unite the Conservative party. To do this she appointed in Carrington's place Francis Pym, someone who had previously opposed her economic policy and been demoted in the Cabinet reshuffle of September 1981.

The appointment of Francis Pym was to lead to 'some serious difficulties' (Thatcher, 1993 p187) during the Haig mission as both Thatcher and Pym had differing views on how the crisis should be resolved. Thatcher's policy was to restore British authority by whatever means required, whether it be negotiations, military pressure or the use of force, (Gompert, 1985). Pym meanwhile was intent on securing the best diplomatic solution that was possible, as long as Britain avoided war, (Thatcher, 1993).

Whilst Thatcher's response to the Argentine invasion was seen by some as 'hawkish' (Nef and Hallman, 1982 p7) it was not out of sync with the reaction of the House of Commons who seemed more outraged than Thatcher herself. Labour leader Michael Foot stated Britain had a 'moral duty, a political duty and every other sort of duty…to win back the islands,' (Morgan, 1982 p26). SDP leader David Owen was as belligerent as any Conservative, (Marr, 2007). In fact, the only Political Party to oppose the war was Plaid Cymru. The debate of 3rd April 'influenced party rhetoric' in that it united parties behind the taskforce, which was to later discourage diplomatic compromise, (Burns, 1985 p7).

Similar to the political reaction, the reaction of the media could only serve to have given the British government a fair wind. The Press reaction was mostly fully supportive of the decision to send the taskforce. The *Daily Mail* triumphantly declared 'forcing Argentina to dislodge the Falklands is a bloody, hazardous and formidable enterprise it can be done, it must be done,' (Harris, 1983 p40). The *Sun* ran with the unprecedentedly crass headline 'We'll SMASH 'EM!' (Harris, 1983 p41). The *Guardian* gave a more guarded response: 'the fleet sails in restitution, the cause this time is a just one,' (Adams, 1986 p10). The *Financial Times* invoking cost benefit analysis was more sceptical, (Adams, 1986). Initially outright opposition came only from the Daily Mirror that featured an editorial entitled 'Might isn't right.' The editorial went on to say 'Argentine occupation has humiliated the government but military revenge is not the way forward…the main purpose of British policy should now be to get the best possible settlement for the islanders,' (Harris, 1983 p44).

There are undoubtedly striking similarities between the position of the British and Argentine governments in the lead up to the Falklands crisis. Both were beleaguered by recession, high unemployment and a myriad of social tensions which are associated with an unsuccessful domestic program, (Nef and Hallman, 1982). It is therefore of little surprise that either government would leap at an external diversion to focus attention away from domestic failures. With public attention of both countries united behind their governments and focused so closely on the crisis, any sign of 'retreat' combined with already perceived domestic failure would have grave consequences for either government. This was to be an overriding consideration to both Galtieri and Margaret Thatcher as they approached the route of diplomacy to solve the Falklands crisis.

The Haig Mediation attempt

For the US the Falklands crisis represented a potentially disastrous balancing act. The Reagan administration found itself having to mediate between two important allies in two key parts of the western world. The US, as the leader of NATO, was militarily committed to Western Europe. At a time when anti American sentiments were running high on the continent the Reagan administration could not afford to withhold support from the their solitary unconditional ideological ally in the region: The Thatcher government, (Nef and Hallman, 1982). The Argentine Junta had however demonstrated unwavering friendliness towards Washington. Contrary to the more prevalent trend in third world countries, the generals of the Junta dismissed the notion of rich exploitative nations versus the poor under developed world, (Feldman, 1985). Indeed Argentina had aligned itself with the Reagan administration's own 'communist versus free world position', (Nef and Hallman, 1982 p7). Therefore Haig had an agenda shaped by American interests. President Reagan was keen for the two protagonists to 'sort it out' (Haig, 1984 p264) and avoid war. Reagan thus provided Haig with his full support, (Richardson, 1996). If the Falklands crisis escalated then the US could be forced to take sides. This could do untold damage to its standing in Britain or Argentina. Even remaining neutral would likely cause serious damage to US standing in Britain, (Freedman, 1990).

It was with these considerations in mind that Haig arrived in London on April 8th to begin negotiations. The first tentative peace proposals put forward involved the diversion of the British fleet, withdrawal of Argentine forces and the interposing of a peacekeeping force made up of personnel from Canada, the US and two unspecified Latin American countries. This would then be followed by negotiations. Thatcher replied that the proposals were unacceptable, as they did not meet her basic requirement that 'Argentine forces withdraw and that the Falklands be returned to British administration,' (Thatcher, 1993 p193). In his memoirs Haig describes how Thatcher 'had the bit between her teeth', invoking memories of Neville Chamberlain and the importance of not rewarding aggression, (Haig, 1984 p272). This statement appeared to mirror the collective view of the British media who had in many quarters likened Galtieri to Hitler, (Eddy, 1982). The *Times* had days earlier described Argentina's action as 'a perfect example of unprovoked aggression the world has had to witness since the end of Adolf Hitler' (3rd April 1982). Indeed, Haig and his negotiating team were taken aback by the depth of feeling they encountered among the British leadership and somewhat bemused by the comparisons of Galtieri with Hitler, considering Galtieri was after all still a US ally, (Richardson, 1996). After meeting with Thatcher, Haig telephoned Reagan and described Thatcher's mood as 'belligerent', (Haig, 1984 p273).

On the evening of 9th April Haig was welcomed in Argentina by Foreign Minister Costa Mendez. As Haig and the team drove into Buenos Aires they were welcomed by mass patriotic fervour in the streets. This was followed the next day by a mass gathering in the Plaza de Mayo that supported Argentina's reclaiming of the Malvinas. Whilst this event was to an extent stage managed (Gompert, 1985) with the media urging Argentines to show Haig 'The spirit of Argentina', (Freedman, 1990 p173) there is little doubting that the Malvinas invoked a wave of national feeling amongst the Argentine people. This was evident from the euphoria that broke out in Buenos Aires after it was announced the Malvinas had been reclaimed, (Burns, 1987).

Negotiations began with Argentina on the 10th April. Galtieri stated that Argentina was prepared to negotiate on everything except for Argentine sovereignty, (Haig, 1984). Haig knew that a basis for settlement could not be founded on Argentine sovereignty as it would be rejected by London. Instead Haig proposed a simultaneous withdrawal of forces and the creation of a demilitarised zone, an interim administration along the lines of what had been suggested to Britain and a guarantee that sovereignty would be negotiated by the year's end. Haig's proposals were completely removed from Argentine interests and expectations, (Freedman, 1990). They made no mention of

Argentine sovereignty or Argentine participation in governing of the islands. Galtieri told Haig that these were required pre-requisites if a diplomatic settlement was to be reached, (Freedman, 2007).

Galtieri reported back to the military committee who decided not to adopt any of the new American ideas but instead restate the original Argentine requirements. Argentina expected to run the Malvinas with perhaps some islander involvement and some external guarantees. Further discussions took place on 11th April. During these discussions Haig thought that he had gained a major breakthrough and that the Argentine problem was that there was insufficient Argentine presence in the interim administration of the islands, (Freedman, 1990). From reading Haig's account it is difficult to see how he came to this conclusion. In his recollection of negotiations with the Junta, not once was a member of the Junta quoted as saying that increased Argentine involvement in the interim administration was in any way a pre-requisite for a negotiated settlement. As a result Haig and his team began working on a new draft that included greater Argentine involvement in the interim administration.

Haig's hopes of a breakthrough vanished shortly before leaving for London when Haig met with Costa Mendez who handed him a paper that contained the official Argentine proposal. This document asserted the Argentine position that guaranteed sovereignty was non negotiable. Haig describes this as a 'retreat from everything we had accomplished the night before,' (Haig, 1984 p283). This would appear to be an exaggeration on the basis that the Argentine side was totally ignorant of the fact that Haig thought he had a major concession, (Freedman, 2007). However, Haig did have grounds for complaint on the basis that this proposal had not been discussed with Haig and his negotiating team and did not contain did not reflect any of their ideas.

Haig travelled from Buenos Aires to London on 12th April. With him he brought specific peace proposals. These were based on the American draft proposals discussed with Argentina and completely ignored the 'official' Argentine position that Costa Mendez had handed to Haig shortly before his departure for London. The proposals were based around a tripartite administration of the islands made up of Britain, Argentina and the US. Thatcher described these proposals as 'full of holes' but admitted they had 'some attractions', (Thatcher, 1993 p194). Mrs Thatcher was attracted by the possibility that

Argentine forces could be removed from the islands for the price of conceding to a fairly powerless commission. She was still concerned over the security of the islands after the interim, (Thatcher, 1993). As a result Thatcher agreed to a minor role for Argentina so long as it was 'recognisably British', (Freedman, 1990). To Haig this marked a concession, albeit a small one, and he quickly contacted Costa Mendez in Buenos Aires. Costa Mendez showed no interest simply re-stating that the paper he handed to Haig reflected the official Argentine negotiating position and that any other draft had no official status in negotiations, (Freedman, 2007).

By now it was apparent that the Haig mediation effort was in serious trouble. The Argentines were rapidly losing confidence in Haig's ability as a negotiator and were beginning to doubt his integrity. Galtieri and Costa Mendez were growing increasingly concerned that Haig was keeping them in the dark, refusing to give full details of the British position and now refusing to transmit their ideas to the British, (Freedman, 1990). This merely fuelled speculation in Argentina that Haig was only interested in a settlement that favoured the British. This criticism of Haig has been repeated by some historians, who have described Haig's priority in negotiations to 'safeguard British interests and principles,' (Gavshon and Rice, 1984 p70).

The British were also frustrated by Haig's apparent even-handedness. British ambassador to the US Nicholas Henderson characterised Haig's approach as one of taking sides (with the British) whilst giving the impression of complete impartiality, (Henderson, 1983 p31). This was difficult for the British to understand as they saw themselves as an ally who was the victim of aggression. Furthermore the British were struck by the internal divisions amongst Haig and his colleagues. Haig appeared to speak with one voice in private and another in front of his team, (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983 p107). Thatcher was undoubtedly toughened by media polls during mid April that supported a hard-line. One such poll suggested that over three quarters favoured recuperation whilst over half favoured a military rather than diplomatic settlement, (Kinney, 1989).

Haig for his part was becoming increasingly irritated by the intransigence shown by both sides. He described Argentina's decision to renege on what he mistakenly regarded as a significant concession as a 'tragedy for everyone' (Haig, 1984 p283).

The frustration of Haig and his team however was not confined to Argentina. Thomas Enders characterised the British stance at this point as a 'willingness to listen, be drawn along in a process, but not as an active search for a solution,' (Charlton, 1989 p172).

On 13th April Haig was given cause for optimism. A discussion with Costa Mendez yielded what he interpreted as a major concession. Argentina would not insist on an Argentine governor if Britain agreed to 'decolonise' the islands in line with the 1964 UN resolution on decolonisation, (Haig, 1984 p284). It is apparent that Costa Mendez was never intending to signal such a concession. By referring to the 1964 resolution Costa Mendez was seemingly attempting to contrast Britain's earlier willingness to negotiate with what Argentina perceived as Britain's current intransigence, (Freedman, 1990). Argentina's aim was guaranteed sovereignty yet decolonisation would not make Argentine sovereignty inevitable. It is difficult to see how the process of decolonisation could even be applied to the Falklands crisis. Decolonisation in the sense where populations sought independence was over, it could not be applied where the population objected, (Kinney, 1989).

Haig was hopeful that Costa Mendez had given a nod towards self-determination and took this to the British. In his discussions with Thatcher and Francis Pym, Haig put a more positive construction on his conversation with Costa Mendez than it warranted, (Freedman, 2007). Thatcher described this as a 'bizarre turn' (Thatcher, 1993 p198) and both she and Pym remained sceptical but accepted that this apparent concession was worth pursuing. On 14th April Haig was able to extract what he regarded as a 'significant concession', (Haig, 1984 p282). Britain's stance on a guaranteed return of the Falklands to British administration appeared to soften with Thatcher now stating that self-determination for the islanders was her main priority, (Freedman, 1990). In reality Haig's description of this concession as 'significant' is deceptive in that self-determination would most likely have amounted to a restoration of British sovereignty, (Kinney, 1989). Thatcher warned in the House of Commons that Haig's next visit to Buenos Aires will be 'crucial' if a diplomatic settlement was to be found, (The *Times* 15th April 1982).

The second round of negotiations began on 15th April when Haig arrived in Buenos Aires. Haig presented a counter draft worked out in London that included the concessions he had extracted from Britain on the 14th April. The main points included mutual withdraw,

tripartite administration, a guarantee that negotiations would finish by 31st December 1982 and that the eventual settlement would be guided by the principles of decolonisation. To Haig 'it seemed inconceivable that any rational government could reject these terms,' (Haig, 1984 p286). It is difficult to understand why Haig found it inconceivable that Argentina would reject these terms as they did not guarantee sovereignty which was Argentina's stated position. Indeed, the Junta showed little interest in Haig's plan instead putting forward their own counter-proposal. This included mutual withdrawal with British forces pulling back three thousand miles to Ascension Island. The plan still intended to guarantee effective Argentine possession that would lead to sovereignty. In effect Argentina had made no further concessions. Haig told Costa Mendez 'I'm sure the British will shoot when they see this message' (Haig, 1984 p286). Costa Mendez was 'visibly shaken' and suggested that Haig meet with the Junta, (Haig, 1984 p286).

Negotiations were now at stalemate, the two sides formulas were simply not compatible and were effectively addressing the problem from completely different angles, (Freedman, 1990). The Junta was concerned that the interim administration made up of the US, UK and Argentina would strongly favour Britain because it could always be guaranteed US support. Furthermore Argentina was not prepared to accept a negotiated settlement on the basis of decolonisation because it did not guarantee Argentine sovereignty. This was in direct contradiction to the British viewpoint that the islanders must be able to decide their own future.

Haig met the full Junta on the 17th April. Haig sought to encourage the Junta to accept a formula that was sufficiently ambiguous and vague that would allow the appearance of negotiation even though those involved knew the eventual outcome would be Argentine sovereignty, (Calvert, 1982b). The Junta were sceptical. Based on previous experience of negotiating with the UK, they did not believe that Thatcher would concede sovereignty unless this was clearly expressed in a settlement. If they were to accept Haig's proposal then there seemed nothing to stop Britain from sending another taskforce if negotiations did not go their way.

Costa Mendez pressed Haig for the exact British position. Haig refused, knowing that if Mendez was given an accurate account of British views then negotiations would fail. (Freedman, 1990) This only gave rise to the Junta's view that Haig was 'pro British', (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983 p111).

With no obvious movement from the Junta Haig decided to play what he described as a 'wild card', (Haig, 1984 p288). He rang Bill Clark, Reagan's national security adviser on an open line, knowing that the call would be monitored, and warned that British military action was imminent, (Haig, 1984 p288). This seemed to have the desired effect. The Junta came back to Haig with a revised text that removed the insistence upon guaranteed Argentine sovereignty, although this was still implied and conceded that the local traditional administration should be maintained, (Freedman, 1990). Haig pressed for further concessions. The Junta grew increasingly exasperated by this. They believed they had made major concessions but because Haig refused to specify areas of British flexibility the Junta assumed there were none, (Freedman, 2007). As a result the Junta chose to harden their position inserting Argentine control into the interim administration. Haig was angered by this new development but decided to send it to the British anyway despite justifiably believing 'Mrs Thatcher would have great difficulty in accepting this text' (Haig, 1984 p289).

As Haig prepared to leave Buenos Aires on the 19th April he was met by Costa Mendez at the airport. Once again Haig was handed a paper that stated negotiations must conclude by December 1982 and the result must be recognition of Argentine sovereignty, (Kinney, 1989). Haig was furious. He refused to communicate the contents of the note knowing it would mean the likely end of negotiations. He regarded the Argentine decision making process as a shambles and saw them as 'constantly going back on their word,' (Haig, 1984 p290). The Junta for their part were equally unimpressed with Haig regarding him as a smokescreen whilst the British fleet closed in on the South Atlantic, (Freedman, 1990).

The British were unimpressed by Haig's draft which Thatcher described as 'quite unacceptable' (Thatcher, 1993 p203). Some commentators have described the 19th April draft agreement as incorporating major concessions, (Gavshon and Rice, 1984 p65). This is simply not true. Despite concession on withdrawal and the interim administration the document completely ignored the British pre-requisite of self determination. An acceptance of these proposals would have led to eventual Argentine sovereignty, (Calvert, 1982b). Thatcher by now was clearly growing impatient with the whole exercise and it was with reluctance she was persuaded by Pym to carry on with negotiations.

Thatcher was not the only one growing impatient with Haig's mediation attempt. On 14th April Michael Foot told the House of Commons that whilst he was not attempting to 'detract' from the efforts of General Haig, he was 'eager at the beginning that this matter should be taken to the United Nations,' (Morgan, 1982 p73). Dennis Healy followed this on the 19th with a statement that if Haig should decide he can no longer play the role of an 'honest broker' then the British government should consider asking the secretary general of the UN to undertake mediation, (Morgan, 1982 p104).

Thatcher's impatience with the Haig initiative was mirrored by the British media. The *Sun*, which had been consistently disparaging of the Haig mission and by now waging a campaign of repugnant xenophobia responded to reported Argentine intransigence with the headline, 'Stick it up your Junta!' (Harris, 1983 p45). The *Times* presented a more polite but no less damning verdict of the Haig mediation by claiming it had already 'failed', (20th April). The British media's reporting of the Haig initiative had been quite negative, depicting the somewhat disingenuous view that negotiations were being hampered solely by Argentine intransigence. Indeed, large sections of the British media seemed totally ignorant of the fact that the British were no more willing to move from their stated requirements than the Argentines, (Adams, 1986).

Haig decided to make one last attempt at reaching a negotiated settlement. Abandoning shuttle diplomacy and discarding earlier drafts Haig and Reagan agreed the best course of action would be to present an American draft proposal to both sides. The final American proposal bore all the hallmarks of compromise in substance and language, (Calvert, 1982b p106). The proposal was open ended on the question of sovereignty, whilst the reference to decolonisation may at first appear to favour Argentina, the meaning of this was to ensure that any solution would not be pre-defined, (Kinney, 1989). The proposal thus contained neither side's stated pre-conditions. There was no guarantee of Argentine sovereignty nor a firm commitment on self-determination. If anything the proposal favoured the British as it left the British in charge for an unlimited time. It also went some way to placing self-determination at the heart of the matter with the reference to 'will and wishes' of the islanders despite not explicitly guaranteeing self-determination, (Boyce, 2005).

The British received a draft of the proposal on the 24th April, Thatcher was unimpressed describing it as 'conditional surrender', (Thatcher, 1993 p205). She was concerned by the terms of withdraw, the make up of the interim authority which she felt gave Argentina too much presence and the fact that the final settlement made no specific mention of self determination. Francis Pym disagreed, believing it should be accepted as the best negotiated settlement available. Thatcher believed it would be very difficult to accept Haig's proposal in its present form. Indeed sections of the British media were already reporting that Haig's proposal would be rejected, (The *Times* 24th April 1982).

As a result it was decided that the proposal should be put to Argentina first. Argentina duly rejected the proposal on the basis that there was no time limit for negotiations, an interim administration that left, in the words of Costa Mendez 'the real possibility of establishing a predominantly British administration indefinitely' (Gavshon and Rice, 1984 p69) and no predetermined Argentine sovereignty. As a result Haig announced on 30th April that his plan had been rejected by Argentina and blamed Argentina for the collapse of negotiations. There is little doubting that Haig's simplistic explanation does not tell the whole story, thus it is now necessary to examine in detail all of the contributing factors towards the failure of Haig's diplomacy.

Firstly Haig was not helped by the character of decision-making on both sides. From the British point of view, Haig notes in his memoirs that there was considerable division in the British government and Thatcher was less intent on a diplomatic settlement than most of her War Cabinet, particularly Francis Pym, (Haig, 1984). Thatcher paid little notice to Pym and due to her authoritarian style of government Haig was left in no doubt who was in charge. This was not the case with Argentina and as mediation wore on Haig became increasingly disenchanted with the lack of a clear line of authority. Galtieri and Costa Mendez were not in a position to bargain in 'good faith' (Haig, 1984 p286) and apparent concessions were open to veto by not only other members of the Junta but also by numerous corps commanders on various service councils, (Richardson, 1996 p132). Indeed twice, Costa Mendez was forced to deliver last minute messages that went back on concessions. In truth neither the British nor Argentine system lent themselves to compromise.

Secondly the very simplicity of the issue created considerable difficulty. The role of a mediator is to find an 'area of potential agreement' (Hoffman, 1992 p266) yet the opposing demands of guaranteed sovereignty and self-determination are impossible to reconcile and leave very little room for negotiation. Whilst both sides did at times make significant concessions, particularly Thatcher who agreed to changes about the character of the administration that would have been unthinkable a month earlier, neither side was willing to move on their stated pre-condition.

This intransigence was to an extent influenced by public opinion. In Argentina the capture of the Malvinas' led to an outbreak of nationalistic feeling, (Lewis, 2003). Galtieri and the rest of the Junta were now faced with and undoubtedly influenced by domestic, civilian pressure that demanded details of negotiations and the promise that sovereignty would not be handed away. Thatcher for her part was also strongly influenced by public opinion and her stance was undoubtedly hardened by the jingoistic reaction of the British media which for the most part advocated and supported a hard-line against Argentina and tended to belittle Haig's peace initiative. Opinion Polls also often showed an overwhelming majority in favour of Thatcher's perceived toughness with Argentina, (The *Times* 26th April). As a result it was felt in London and Buenos Aires that neither government could survive backing down. One unnamed member of the War Cabinet accurately described the situation: 'No agreement was possible that would keep both governments in power and neither government was willing to cut its own throat,' (Richardson, 1996 p130).

Intransigence was also created by the fact that military action had not yet begun. Thus, the strength of each sides negotiating position was not wholly transparent. Whilst some members of the British government were nervous about the chances of a military victory, the majority including Thatcher herself were optimistic and this created few grounds for compromise, (Freedman, 1990). The Argentines were more fearful of British military capability but evidently not sufficiently to step away from their demand of Argentine sovereignty. The true strength of each side's negotiating position would not become apparent until the fighting started.

Haig's negotiating team were ill-prepared for negotiations. The state department's early contention that the crisis was a 'Gilbert and Sullivan battle over a sheep pasture' only

underscores the lack of US understanding of the Falklands dispute. This is unsurprising given Haig himself admits that at the start of mediation that he did not enjoy a 'complete understanding of the origins of the crisis,' (Feldman, 1985 p15). Moreover the shuttle was so heavily weighted with European specialists that only Vernon Walters had a working knowledge of Spanish, an ability which forced him to double as both negotiator and translator, (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983).

Haig's own failings are also clearly apparent particularly in his dealings with Argentina. His failure to transmit or even give the impression of transmitting the British position to Argentina led to the Junta deeply mistrusting him. An unnamed Argentine official described how the Argentine perception of Haig was 'that he went to London first and then came here with a piece of paper to sign,' (Eddy, 1982 p56). Argentine concessions seemed to go unrewarded and as a result this created the impression that both the US and Britain were completely inflexible. Haig's impatience also proved costly. Despite regarding Argentine concessions on 19th April as 'miraculous' (Freedman, 1990 p210) he pursued further concessions that led to the Junta returning to their previous intransigent stance and effectively undoing all he had accomplished.

Haig's actions were dictated by a US agenda. The Reagan administration wanted war to be avoided at all costs. If war took place then the US could only lose. Allying itself with Britain would seriously harm relations with Argentina whilst remaining neutral would cause untold harm to relations with Britain. The US agenda led to suspicion of the Haig initiative, particularly on the British side who became increasingly irritated with Haig's perceived neutrality. Michael Palliser, an adviser to the war cabinet stated 'Haig would have been happy with any settlement, including one that gave Argentina everything it wanted,' (Richardson, 1996 p133).

Argentina and Britain's mistrust of the US mediation was compounded by the fact that both sides greatly over-estimated the influence the US exercised over the other. A British MP incorrectly stated that the 'US could stop this matter overnight,' (Financial Times April 15th 1982). Similarly Galtieri told Haig 'I do not understand why the US government with all its resources cannot stop Mrs Thatcher from launching this attack,' (Haig, 1984 p284).

Conclusion

Historians now tend to agree that the failure of the Haig mission was inevitable. This failure, was not however brought about by Britain or Argentina protecting their national honour, (Kinney, 1989) or in Britain's case defending its democratic principles, (Gibran, 2008). The overwhelming reason for the failure of the Haig mission is considerably more cynical. As the two world wars dramatically illustrate there is a tendency for economic crises and social strife to be solved by the flexing of international muscles, (Nef and Hallman, 1982). Governments who wage campaigns of popular outrage against external foes can effectively obscure internal domestic problems. Lord Carrington quite correctly stated in his memoirs 'General Galtieri needed some sort of diversion to unite a discontented and long suffering Argentina' (Carrington, 1988 p358). The same, however could just as easily be used to describe Thatcher and Britain's political situation in April 1982. It is hardly surprising that the Thatcher government leapt at an external diversion from its domestic woes. The main problem as far as diplomacy is concerned is that for both sides the Falklands War quickly became a winner-takes-all scenario with the very political survival of those in power at stake.

Any diplomatic settlement would depend on a high degree of compromise yet the political context with which the war was fought made such compromise impossible. Galtieri and Thatcher in effect staked their political careers on their stated preconditions of sovereignty and self-determination, two opposing and completely irreconcilable viewpoints. Whilst both sides made concessions that were not trivial, such concessions always steered clear of the central question of eventual sovereignty of the islands. No diplomatic settlement would have been possible unless either Galtieri or Thatcher had backed down from their stated preconditions. Considering such a retreat would have cost either their political careers, it is impossible to see how Haig could have mediated a diplomatic settlement that satisfied both parties and kept both Galtieri and Thatcher in power.

The role of the United States must also be considered. A diplomatic settlement would require a high degree of even-handedness. This could never be used to describe US attitudes to the issues at hand. The US persistently and publicly condemned the Argentine use of force, Haig also chose to make it abundantly obvious to the Junta that if war came then the US would back Britain. The essence of US diplomacy was

to attempt to extract sufficient concessions from Argentina, so these could be made acceptable to Britain. Seemingly it never occurred to Haig to ask for equal concessions from both sides. Whilst Argentina bemoaned what they perceived as Haig's blatant bias towards Britain, the British were just as frustrated with Haig because of his apparent neutrality. The result of Haig's mediation was that neither side trusted each other and neither side was willing to accept the US as playing the part of an honest broker.

Haig's final proposal on the 24th April was entrenched in compromise. Yet the underlying problem virtually defied solution through compromise. Haig's solution was to ask both sides to retreat from their stated pre-conditions. Yet such a retreat could never have been acceptable to either side in view of what was at stake. To both sides diplomacy was preferable as a means of achieving their aims but not in an absolute sense. Both Thatcher and Galtieri would rather resort to force than back down and thus end their political careers. As a result of this, the Falklands crisis, the thorn in side of British foreign policy for several decades, was finally settled not by diplomacy, but by what we now call the Falklands War of 1982.

REFERENCES

ADAMS, V. (1986) *The Media and the Falklands Campaign.* Hampshire: Macmillan.

BECK, P. (1988) *The Falklands Crisis as an International Problem*. London: Routledge.

BOYCE, D. (2005) *The Falklands War.* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

BURNS, J. (1987) *The Land that Lost its Heroes: How Argentina Lost the Falklands War.* London: Bloomsbury.

BURNS, R. (1985) *Diplomacy, War and Parliamentary Democracy: Further Lessons from the Falklands or Advice from Academe*. New York: University Press of America.

CALVERT, P. (1982a) 'The causes of the Falklands conflict'. *Contemporary Review*, July 1982, pp 6-11.

CALVERT, P. (1982b) *The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs*. London: Frances Pinter.

CARRINGTON, P (1988) *Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington.* London: Collins.

CHARLTON, MICHAEL. (1989) *The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Crisis*. London: Blackwell.

COATES, T. (ed) (2001) *The Falklands Islands Review: report of a committee of Privy Counsellors* chaired by Lord Franks 1983, in War in the Falklands. London: HM Stationary Office.

DABAT, A. and LORENZANO, L. (1984) *Argentina: The Malvinas and the end of military rule.* Translated by R. Johnstone. London: Verso Editions.

EDDY, P. (1982) *The Falklands War.* London: Andre Deutche.

EVANS, E. (1997) *Thatcher and Thatcherism.* London: Routledge.

FELDMAN, D. (1985) The United States Role in the Malvinas Crisis 1982, *Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs,* 27(2), pp1-21.

FINANCIAL TIMES (1982) *'US Feels Thatcher Wrath Over Falklands'*, Thursday 15th April, p1.

FREEDMAN L. (2007) The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. Volume 2: *War and Diplomacy*. Oxon: Routledge.

FREEDMAN, L and GAMBIA-STONEHOUSE, V. (1990) *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982.* London: Faber and Faber ltd.

GAVSHON, A and RICE, D. (1984) *The Sinking of the Belgrano.* London: Secker and Warburg.

GEORGE, P. (1984) Argentine Politics and the Falklands Issue In Bolton, D. RUSI and BRASSEY'S *Defence Yearbook 1984*. Oxford: Brassey's Publishers.

GIBRAN, D. (2008) *The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic*. London: McFarland and Co inc.

GOMPERT, D (1985) 'American diplomacy and the Haig mission: an insiders

perspective'. In A. Coll and A. Arend (eds) *The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law.* London: Allen and Unwin.

GREEN, E. (2006) *Thatcher*, London: Hodder Education.

HAIG, A (1984) *Caveat.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

HARRIS, R. (1983) *GOTCHA! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis.* London: Faber and Faber.

HASTINGS, M AND JENKINS, S. (1983) *Battle for the Falklands.* London: Michael Joseph.

HENDERSON, N (1983) 'America and the Falklands: case study in the behaviour of an ally'. Economist (7315) 12-18th November.

HOFFMAN, M. (1992) 'Third Party mediation and conflict resolution in the post-war world', in Bayliss, J. and Rengger, N. J. (eds), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International issues in a changing world.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp261-86.

KINNEY, D. (1989) *National Interest/ National Honor; The Diplomacy of the Falklands Crisis.* New York: Praeger.

LEWIS, D. (2003) *The History of Argentina.* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

MARR, A. (2007) *A History of Modern Britain.* London: Macmillan.

MORGAN, K. (ed) (1982) *The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons* 2nd April to 15th June 1982. London: HM Stationary Office.

NEF, J AND HALLMAN, F. (1982) Reflections on the Anglo-Argentinean War, *International Perspectives,* Sep/Oct 1982, pp 6-10.

RICHARDSON, L. (1996) *When Allies Differ: Anglo American relations during the Suez and Falkland Crises.* New York: St Martins Press.

SELDON, A AND COLLINGS, D. (2000) *Britain Under Thatcher.* Essex: Longman.

THATCHER M (1993) *The Downing Street Years.* London: HarperCollins.

THE TIMES. 1st April- 30th May 1982 (Accessed via The Times digital archive via Birmingham libraries).

TORRE, J AND DE RIZ, L. (1993) Argentina since 1946 in L. Bethell *Argentina Since Independence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The (R)evolutionary lyrics of The Beatles:
A Stylistic Exploration into the Evolution of The Beatles' British Singles

Hannah Turner

ABSTRACT

A linguistic stylistic analysis was carried out upon the lyrics of The Beatles' British singles, released between 1962 and 1970. Analysis took into account the linguistic organisation of lyrics using stylistics as a primary approach. Context and other literary theory were also taken into account in order to justify the stylistic choices of the authors. The singles were divided into four stages of evolution entitled, 'Establishment', 'Deviation', 'Experimentation' and 'Postmodernism'. Stages suggest common stylistic choices, linguistic organisational structure and contextual themes. Findings showed that stylistic choices made by the authors were dependent upon context and the lyrics demonstrated a definite evolution in songwriting style that reflected the cultural change of the decade. Such interpretations are still being utilised today, evolving them even further, thus, making the lyrics an important literary discourse.

KEYWORDS

The Beatles' British Singles, Lennon and McCartney, Song Lyrics, Stylistic Analysis, Linguistics.

Introduction

Poets are able to manipulate language in a way that transcends conventional expression, through linguistic devices such as rhyme, metre, symbol, imagery, metaphor, lexis, and sound. Songwriters too use these devices. In fact 'lyric poems' (Padgett, 2000 p105) that are not intended for musical accompaniment are widely accepted forms of poetry that employ similar features to popular song lyrics.

Broadly described as 'literary', it is clear that the style of The Beatles' songs changed during the 1960's, but it is exactly *how* and *why* they changed that is most interesting. These questions can be addressed by exploring the use of language; 'the various forms, patterns and levels that constitute linguistic structure', essentially the style in which the language is employed (Simpson, 2004 p2). Stylistic choices within a text's structure therefore can determine 'the function of a text' and can be considered the 'gateway to interpretation' (Simpson, 2004 p2). The songs of The Beatles invite this type of analysis rather well and can therefore be used in discovering *how* the songs evolve. Notably, 'stylistics is interested in language as a function of texts in context', therefore both the organisation of linguistic structure and context can be seen to be 'inextricably' linked (Simpson, 2004 p3). Hence the importance of addressing the context of The Beatles' lyrics in order to justify the stylistic choices of the authors and discover *why* the songs evolve.

Between the years of 1962 and 1970 a total of twenty-two singles were released in Britain by the Beatles, with a total of forty-four songs that make up the singles' A and B sides (Turner, 1999 p220); just The Beatles' British singles is a significant body of work to analyse. The singles have been divided into four stages of 'evolution'. These stages comprise common stylistic choices which include organisation of linguistic devices, grammatical and structural arrangements and contextual themes. The stages are entitled: 'Establishment', 'Deviation', 'Experimentation' and 'Postmodernism'.

Establishment

In Britain the first single to be released was entitled 'Love Me Do' (Lennon and McCartney, 1962). The song essentially consists of two stanzas with its first stanza being repeated four times:

'Love, love me do,

You know I love you.

I'll always be true

So please love me do, who ho love me do.'

The release of this single as a debut was quite a cunning move, 'serving to introduce The Beatles to the English public in several ways at once' (Macdonald, 2005 p59-60). Indeed not only are The Beatles addressing the universal theme of love within the song, which is instantly appealing, but also, the declarative statement 'love me do' is somewhat ambiguous. The statement is asking the unidentified, 'you' to love them. 'You' in this case is a personal pronoun. The song can be seen as an exchange between two potential lovers. However, the use of a personal pronoun which lacks explicitness also subtly but effectively allows The Beatles to cunningly ask their potential listening audience for acceptance and love. Such sentiments are enticed with the promise that the speaker, 'I' will 'always be true'. A certain amount of importance is placed upon the listener by personally addressing them in this way, therefore effectively *establishing* a relationship between The Beatles and their audience from the beginning of their career. The simplicity of the song's message is portrayed through the song's lexical choice. With the exception of the word 'someone' and 'always', all words possess only one syllable. The word 'love' is repeated a total of 'twenty-one times' (Turner, 1999 p23). It is also interesting to note that there is absolutely no deviation in the rhyme scheme whatsoever, emphasising its simplicity.

Clearly there are already deliberate stylistic choices which are dependent upon context. Essentially there is a 'fashioning of language' in order to serve a specific purpose, in this case, establishing an initial audience (Widdowson, 1992 p7). In addition, the various 'levels of language' being used are arguably 'retrievable' or identifiable to the receiver of the text (Simpson, 2004 p4-5). Therefore, such 'simplistic' stylistic choices within this stage consequently 'created a very distinctive genre with its own linguistic characteristics' (Cook and Mercer, 2000 p92), appropriate to their cause. However McCartney, defending such simplicity, states that it was The Beatles at their most philosophical, 'you can't have anything simpler yet more meaningful than "love, love me do", that's just what it means' (Aldridge, 1998 p14). This notion can perhaps be likened to the stylistics of a Haiku poem which include simple 'expressions' that abstractly convey a much grander or universal concept (Padgett, 2000 p86). Such philosophical significance is most interesting, when later songs such as 'Strawberry Fields Forever' (Lennon and McCartney, 1967) are in comparison deemed to be perhaps more philosophically credible *because* of their complicated nature.

In 'From Me to You' (Lennon and McCartney, 1963) the physicality of a potential relationship is explored. A definite juxtaposition is implied with the metaphorical connotations of the phrase 'Just call on me and I'll send it along, with love from me to you' and the physicality of the proceeding lines, 'I got arms that long to hold you'. The use of the words, 'lips', 'kiss', 'hold' and 'arms' provide a semantic field of physicality which, to the stereotypical teenager 'fancying themselves in love', (Cook and Mercer, 2000 p91) appeals to the senses. With the Beatles' growing popularity, or emergent 'Beatlemania', the use of such lexis displaying an explicit physicality was sure to 'drive the fans crazy' (Macdonald, 2005 p79-80).

At this point it is interesting to note that with the release of Betty Friedan's, 'The Feminine Mystique' in 1963 (Selden et al, 2005 p120) a new-wave of feminism was establishing itself at this point in history. This type of feminism argues that language is and has been predominantly *man* made. The linguistic devices employed by The Beatles in order to entice fans (who were mostly female) to buy their records are perhaps therefore, typical of a controlling 'male discourse' (Selden et al, 2005 p212). However, to counter this argument, the lyrics of 'Thank you Girl' (Lennon and McCartney, 1963), could be interpreted as an intentional but metaphorical 'thank you letter to their fans' (Cross, 2005 p446).

Singles investigated up until this point have been reminiscent of immediate conversation, with the speaker only addressing the pronoun 'you' within the text. This all changed with the release of 'She Loves You' (Lennon and McCartney, 1963). The discourse incorporates a reported dialogue of a conversation with the third person, the singular pronoun 'she'. The idea of a 'reported conversation', as McCartney comments, gave 'another dimension' to the song (The Beatles Anthology, 2003) thus; progression is evident even within the limitations of Establishment. Furthermore, the idea that the speaker should carry not only a message of love, but is quite literally a messenger of love is rather interesting. The line 'She says she loves you' is perhaps reminiscent of young teenage girls gossiping, which yet again appeals to The Beatles' target audience.

The simple yet effective exploration of love, the use of a simple alternate rhyming scheme, and the frequent repetition of certain lines at the end of each stanza or refrain, were common stylistic features within early Beatles' singles released between 1962 and

1963. If a refrain was present in a song this would normally be the source of the song's title (Everett, 1999 p16). Repetition of phrases also emphasise the general theme of love that all of the songs carry. This ensured that the audience could identify with the songs and The Beatles themselves, which was an important part of their establishment. Consequently, an immediate metaphorical relationship was established between The Beatles and their listeners.

Deviation

The most noticeable change within the 'Deviation' stage of evolution is a new exploration of love and relationships. Singles released between 1964 and 1965 have a new subversive tendency to address a cynical side of love that is perhaps unrequited, apathetic or complicated. Perhaps the only exception is 'I Feel Fine' (Lennon McCartney, 1964). The compound sentence here denotes its uncomplicated optimism: 'I'm in love with her and I feel fine.'

Up until now the theme of love and relationships has been completely intrinsic. Within the single 'Can't buy Me Love' (Lennon and McCartney, 1964) we begin to see extrinsic elements such as money affecting the dynamics of a relationship, a slight subversion upon the love theme. The Beatles are perhaps now becoming aware of their increasing success and wealth. The sentence structure within the song is a combination of complex sentences: 'Tell me that you want the kind of thing that money just can't buy' and compound sentences: 'Say you don't need no diamond ring and I'll be satisfied'. This represents a substantial deviation from 'Love, love me do'. The juxtaposition of regular rhyming pattern versus the more intricate sentence structure perhaps echoes the complexities presented to us by the paradoxical idea of love versus money. Stylistics would argue that meaning or 'context, is [now] internal, potential and dependent on language' (Widdowson, 1992 p33). Although extrinsic contextual elements such as wealth may be imposing upon the subject matter, essentially a new stylistic 'representation' can be intrinsically denoted. This suggests a more sophisticated approach to constructing the lyrics. Consequently, provoking 'the reader into divergent interpretation[s]' of the subject matter (Widdowson, 1992 p33). This is in contrast to the previous use of language that often depended on 'actual context' being present within a song (Widdowson, 1992 p33), for instance the immediate conversation of 'She

Loves You'. In essence, 'Can't Buy Me Love' prefaced the second phase of The Beatles' career: that of 'global recognition and "standard" status' (Macdonald, 2005 p107).

Such stylistic 'representation' is exemplified throughout the stage of deviation. As well as 'Can't Buy Me Love' the image of 'diamond rings' recur in 'I Feel Fine': 'He buys her diamond rings you know' and 'I'm Down' (Lennon and McCartney, 1965): 'Man buys ring woman throws it away'. This imagery is extended in the songs 'A Hard Day's Night' (Lennon and McCartney, 1964), where the speaker proclaims: 'You know I work all day, To get you money to buy you things,' and 'She's a woman' (Lennon and McCartney, 1964), where the focus is on receiving material goods: 'My love don't give me presents'. The reoccurring image suggests a strong semantic field of materialism. Alternatively, emblems such as diamond rings commonly associated with marriage in particular is perhaps a reflection of commitment, opposed to the flirtatious frivolity explored within the previous stage. It could be that the diamond ring can now be seen as a symbol of loyalty that is being received from fans, a loyalty that The Beatles worked hard to establish.

Ironically, the way in which both love and materialism is conceived appears to be upon a 'working class ethic', a notion of working hard in order 'to get money to buy things,' as exemplified within 'A Hard Day's Night'. Stylistically, the association that both day and night have, make the phrase a collocation and also an oxymoron, as day and night appear together as opposites. 'Working like a dog' and 'Sleeping like a log' are phrases expressed as similes. The increasing use of linguistic devices here signifies the definite development of The Beatles' evolving writing style.

The emergence of more complex ideas being forced into more intrinsic philosophical expression or 'representation' can be most obviously be seen in the song 'Help!' (Lennon and McCartney, 1965). Lennon, 'admitting that fame and success had only increased his anxiety' (Turner, 1999 p74), sees the song literally as a cry for help. The serious undertones are echoed in the song's B-side 'I'm Down'. Stylistically the song perhaps echoes traces of the popular blues form of poem which was pioneered by Langston Hughes in the mid-twentieth century. The blues has 'almost always a mood of despondency' that is commonly associated with love (Waldron, 1971 p142). As a metaphor the phrase 'I'm Down' does profess a certain element of blues. The stringent

blues poetic form includes 'One long line repeated and a third line to rhyme with the first two' (Waldron, 1971 p141). Although 'I'm Down' does not strictly adhere to the blues form that is illustrated more successfully in the later Beatles' songs, 'Yer blues' (Lennon and McCartney, 1968) and 'For you blue' (Lennon and McCartney, 1970), 'I'm Down' can loosely be likened to this poetic formation, as follows:

'I'm down I'm really down,

I'm down down on the ground

I'm down I'm really down

How can you laugh when you know I'm down?'

With most rock 'n' roll songs having roots within the blues (Padgett, 2000 p29), The Beatles are no exception. Waldron (1971) suggests that the poetry of Hughes, (like The Beatles) was able to deviate and go beyond the restrictive blues formation in order to 'expand the thought of the blues' (Waldron, 1971 p143).

Perhaps coinciding with The Beatles' initial introduction to drugs, 'Day Tripper' was the first song within the singles catalogue to address the issue of drugs with the colloquial term 'tripper'. However, the reference was apparently overlooked by the overriding subject matter, which again expresses dissatisfaction in love. McCartney referred to this as the beginning of The Beatles' psychedelic period where they would put in 'references that we knew our friends would get, but the great British public would not' (Cross, 2005 p334). The song also is the first to overtly reference sexual promiscuity, with lines such as 'She's a big teaser' an apparent euphemism for the phrase, 'She's a prick teaser' (Turner, 1999 p85). The snub to the ignorant listener is another example of the manipulation of language in order to deviate themselves further away from the ideology of both the culture of the time and norms established in their previous songs. Again, such 'representations' are dependent on the internal constructs of language.

Lennon attributed this deviation from the way he wrote previous songs to a meeting with popular folk singer Bob Dylan who urged him to 'listen to the words' (Marchbank, 1978 p75). Stylistically, perhaps starting to think about his own emotions, Lennon ascertains that his writing became expressed more 'subjectively' than 'objectively' (Marchbank,

1978 p80). The Beatles it seems, now at the height of popularity and material wealth had exhausted the conventional theme of love.

Experimentation

By the end of 1965 the swinging Sixties had become a creative, colourful spectrum of art, fashion, photography and music. At this time, a new counterculture was beginning to emerge, in San Francisco, California, USA. The Hippy movement was a 'vision of social justice and personal liberty, Edens of peace, love… And its essence was motion and change' (Reck, 1985 p90). Founded upon eastern philosophy (Macdonald, 2005 p15), the hippy ethos fused ideas of spirituality with drug taking. The hallucinogenic drug LSD or 'LSD experience' (Turner, 1999 p115), was paralleled with spiritual enlightenment associated with 'Hindu and Tibetan Buddhist religions' (Reck, 1985 p91) and is fundamental to the stylistics within the 'Experimental' stage of The Beatles' song writing.

At the beginning of 1966, the song 'Rain' (Lennon and McCartney, 1966) was the first song to introduce an experimental stylistic interpretation of spirituality. The physical images of 'rain' and 'sun' are used as a metaphor to explore the idea that the 'state of [one's] mind' can transcend beyond a physical world of 'rain'. The physical world is therefore merely an 'illusion' (Everett, 1999 p45). The song seems to suggest an alternate state of consciousness the singer is willing to 'show you' if you are willing to embrace the physical world and not 'hide [your] head'. Paradoxical ideas of 'rain' 'shine' and 'dead' and alive, symbolise this division between materialism and insight. Appearing at the end of the record is an apparent indecipherable statement, perhaps another language? Deceivingly, it is the first line 'When the rain comes they run and hide their heads' reversed and played backwards (Cross, 2005 p424). At face value the choice to include such a line is idiosyncratic and stylistically, completely disregards the essentials of grammar. Such experimental linguistic organisation implies a whole new level of 'representation' which 'exploit[s] the latent possibilities of language' (Widdowson, 1992 p33). Again such representation is derivative from the internal patterns of the text which forces us to acknowledge context in order to understand the 'fuller… stylistic analysis that accrues' (Simpson, 2004 p3). Therefore including such a sentence is conceivably an original innovation that contextually enraptures eastern

mysticism, a philosophy which was a 'taste of things to come' within the future stylistic choices of The Beatles' songwriting (Turner, 1999 p102).

From 1966 onwards The Beatles, exhausted with Beatlemania and in need of self actualisation, were ready to embrace this new counterculture. Harrison commented at the time, 'The Beatles got all the material wealth that we needed… We are all in the physical world, yet what we are striving for isn't physical' (Marchbank, 1978 p120). Interestingly the success that brought the wealth of 'diamond rings' glorified within songs of the previous stage of evolution is now discarded in favour of the inner self, as realised within the song, 'Baby You're a Rich Man' (Lennon and McCartney, 1967). Similarly to 'Rain', the notion of being 'rich' is a metaphorical one that pushes beyond the realms of the material world. Money is trivialised into a state of nonsense: 'You keep all your money in a big brown bag inside a zoo', in favour of the prosperity to be found in knowing 'who you are'. The opening question, 'How does it feel to be one of the beautiful people', actively invites its listeners to reflect upon themselves. Previously in the process of Establishment, The Beatles would invite their listeners to identify with the songs, not with their own inner-being. A substantial divergence can now be seen between the style of earlier songs of Establishment and the songs of Experimentation.

Travelling to India, The Beatles were now actively dabbling within 'transcendental meditation… [and the] Krishna consciousness' (Inglis, 1997 p57). Inevitable questions of The Beatles' own identity arose, which perhaps motivated the more complex stylistic linguistic choices within the songs of Experimentation. More concerned with the 'inner trip' (Reck, 1985 p105) Lennon depicts a 'hallucinogenic venture into the mental interior' (Macdonald, 2005 p216) within 'Strawberry Fields Forever' (Lennon and McCartney, 1967). Significantly, Strawberry Fields was the name of a Salvation Army children's home in Liverpool (Cross, 2005 p441). Freely admitting that 'It's getting hard to be someone' the speaker is questioning their own identity perhaps the way we do as adolescents. The song's verses flow freely in a stream of consciousness, against a backdrop that has obvious childhood idyllic associations for Lennon. Frequently disagreeing with himself throughout the song: 'That is I think I disagree', Lennon has trouble ascertaining his thoughts. Such stylistic representation parallels the irregular rhythm and metre. Perhaps Lennon is not too comfortable being in his own 'tree' and regresses to a form of childish, idyllic 'dream' like nostalgia in order to express his

discontentment. Increased proficiency in stylistic structure evidently reflects the need to mature; the way we do as adolescents through experimentation. Complimentary to this, McCartney also chooses to name the song 'Penny Lane' (Lennon and McCartney, 1967) after a Liverpool landmark, drawing upon a vision of his youth. In contrast to 'Strawberry Fields', the narration of local events is a sunny, optimistic recollection recited from the eyes of a child. Such picturesque lyrics could quite naturally be painted into the 'primary colours of a picture book' (Macdonald, 2005 p221). Contextual representations found within these songs, such as questions of identity, can be seen as a continuation of a quest for self knowledge within the realms of the specific eastern philosophy named 'Atman' (Reck, 1985 p112). Child-like imagery can perhaps be attributed to the fundamental hippy ethos of returning to the Eden, 'a regaining of the unprejudiced vision of the child' (Macdonald, 2005 p197). Notably, these notions are beginning to be tackled independently. It seems only right at this point to refer to the songs as belonging to either Lennon or McCartney, as their regression as composers are conceived upon the *individual* LSD experience.

'I am the Walrus' (Lennon and McCartney, 1967) is perhaps the ultimate in experimental, LSD inspired primordial stylistic representation. Retaining the playful childish sentiment from the previous two songs, the lyrics are positively 'linguistic mischief' (Macdonald, 2005 p267). A regression into childhood begins with the homage to the character of the 'Walrus' from Lewis Carroll's poem 'The Walrus and the Carpenter' (Cross, 2005 p371). Furthermore, Lennon recalls a schoolboy chant:

'Yellow matter custard, green slop pie,

All mixed together with a dead dog's eye,

Slap it on a butty, ten foot thick,

Then wash it down with a cup of cold sick.' (Everett, 1999 p133)

This later transforms into 'Yellow matter custard dripping from a dead dog's eye'. Furthermore, Lennon takes delight in the playground rhyme 'oompah, oompah, stick it up your jumper'. More immature word play can be seen with made up, nonsense words such as 'crabalocker', 'semoline' and the notorious, 'Goo goo g'joob'. The apparent

iamb, to which the verse adheres, was conceived upon the sound of a police siren heard outside Lennon's flat. Sibilance hisses a mocking tone: 'Mis-ter ci-ty police-man si-tting pre-tty li-ttle police-man in-a row' (Turner, 1999 p145). The phonology of words is particularly important to the song's rhythm and in this instance, such representation 'expresses a meaningful difference in sound' (Simpson, 2004 p6).

Continuing the philosophy of Atman, 'I am the Walrus' could perhaps be seen as obscurely answering the questions of identity that arose within 'Strawberry Fields':

> 'I am he
>
> As you are he
>
> As you are me'

Such a mix of first, second and third singular personal pronouns make the proclamation perplexing to say the least. Pronouns are being used in a new innovative way not seen in previous songs. Ambiguity concerning pronouns is seen again in the lines professing 'I am the eggman… I am the walrus'.

Certainly the images that occur within the song are various and incoherent. For instance, the cultural-religious reference to 'Hare Krishna' is identifiable and yet is juxtaposed with the 'Elementary penguin'. Such playfulness of language it seems, 'cannot be interpreted by a direct application of conventional logic' (Widdowson, 1992 p5). Ironically this is just what Lennon intended. The notion of critics analysing his lyrics an inconceivable concept, Lennon deliberately set out in 'writing a song so inscrutable that it could only yield the most laughable attempt at analytical parsing' (Everett, 1999 p133). However, it is this very notion that has determined the linguistic style of the piece. Indeed, it is the manner in which the lyrics express themselves that is fragmented - not the message - and stylistic analysis is able to support this notion. Thus, there is a reason for incoherent stylistic choice; Macdonald (2005 p267) suggests 'It is the ultimate anti-institutional rant'. The laugh at the expense of such critics is perpetuated in later songs from Lennon, notably 'Glass Onion' (Lennon and McCartney, 1968) in the line: 'Well here's another clue for you all, The walrus was Paul'. These fragmented images and apparent 'intertextual' (Simpson, 2004 p21) borrowings from literature credit the song with postmodern acclaim. Accompanying the literary character of the 'Walrus' is the

author 'Edgar Allen Poe' and a literal reading at the end of the song is taken from Shakespeare's tragedy 'King Lear' (Everett, 1999 p134). The 'stylistic patchwork' (Reck, 1985 p104) of linguistic word play reflects the height of the 1960's experimentation in all manners of context which, contrary to the author's intentions, make the song very relevant indeed. It is clear that the juxtaposition of lexis from a previous systematic word order to unsystematic is perhaps what characterises the stage of experimentation the most. Paradoxical ideas can be seen throughout, as plainly presented within the title of the single, 'Hello Goodbye' (Lennon McCartney, 1967).

A noticeable rejection of the love song coincides with a new tendency to concentrate on fictional characters: 'Eleanor Rigby' (Lennon and McCartney, 1966), 'Lady Madonna' (Lennon and McCartney, 1968) and the naming of places seen in 'Penny Lane'. This significant progression is perhaps the result of a bemused detachment of the songwriters. The Beatles were becoming far less concerned with the relationship with their fans that they had tried so hard to establish. This consequently inspired a new form of 'narrative stylistics' (Simpson, 2004 p18), and a decrease in the use of personal pronoun, or 'you' and 'I' perspective. Now we are invited to engage with the speaker who recounts a story. For McCartney in particular, 'it was now to do more like writing your novel' (Everett, 1999 p99). 'Paperback Writer' (Lennon and McCartney, 1966) is the first of McCartney's character studies to deviate wholly from the theme of love. This newly inspired style suggests a confidence and authority that is not present within previous songs. Now acting as a novelist, the characterisation of 'Eleanor Rigby' in particular is sincere and thoughtful. One of 'the lonely people' Eleanor Rigby vividly evokes compassion. As does Lady Madonna, who with baby at her breast (more than likened to the universal image of the Virgin Mary) struggles to 'make ends meet'. Within 'Lady Madonna' we see an apparent celebration of motherhood and life juxtaposed with the theme of death within 'Eleanor Rigby' (yet another paradox).

Interestingly, the women in these songs are no longer diminutively referred to as 'baby', 'little girl' or seen as objects of desire as with previous songs. However stylistics dictates that they are still about women, narrated from an 'omniscient' male perspective (Simpson, 2004 p21). Feminist theory may argue Eleanor Rigby is depicted as a stereotypical spinster (lonesome, elderly and unmarried). Lady Madonna is perhaps the stereotypical housewife. While not all songs may suggest gender differences, it

is interesting to note some aspects of The Beatles' songs as ones that maintain male patriarchal power through their discourse. Undermining feminist movements of the time, perhaps not all of the songs therefore reflect the cultural change of the 1960s.

The stage of Experimentation was perhaps the most 'poignant', creative moment within The Beatles' career. A newly acquired perspective had created a 'multicoloured "1960's anything goes"' stylistic approach to writing (Reck, 1985 p104). Evidently however, The Beatles' songwriting style was beginning to fragment. Eastern philosophy and the individual LSD experience now dominated their free time. The hippy movement provided everything The Beatles needed to individualise themselves stylistically, as songwriters. This new fragmented trend develops further into the last stage of evolution.

Postmodernism

Stylistic lyrical experimentation by 1968 was beginning to decrease. Songs such as 'I am the Walrus' were perhaps the first obvious glimpses of what can only be described as a postmodern approach to writing. Postmodernism can be characterised as 'a common tendency to re-evaluate the modern desires for unity, objectivity, enlightenment and progress' (Whitely, 2000 p105). Stylistically, Beatles' singles released between 1968 and 1970 encompass a very postmodern approach to writing. Effectively a 'fragmented' (Whitely, 2000 p114) style of writing materialised that undoubtedly was a continuation of The Beatles' need to individualise themselves. Whitely (2000 p114) suggests fragmentation is the postmodern idea that texts are unrelated, 'paradoxical and contradictory'. Stylistically, this idea was already beginning to emerge in the previous stage of evolution and is seen to continue within this stage.

Features such as an incoherent linguistic structure refusing to adhere to rules of grammar and a decrease in the personal pronoun can be likened to the way postmodernism dictates a certain alienation in a lack of social structure, essentially a rejection of a 'master narrative' (Whitley 2000 p106). Such stylistic choices can perhaps best be explained in terms of postmodernism and described as 'Anti-representation'. Macdonald (2005 p267) suggests that The Beatles' 'enthusiasm for "random"' or anti-representation 'was starting to degenerate into more or less anything, however daft or irrelevant'. However, both stylistics and postmodern theory propose that such 'representation is a mode of meaning' and to 'transpose [it] into other terms … would be to reduce it to reference, to the kind of conventional statement it challenges' (Widdowson, 1992 p24). 'Anti-representation' therefore is not daft *or* irrelevant.

McCartney originally intended the words of 'Hey Jude' as advice for John Lennon's son Julian, who was at that time dealing with the divorce of his parents (Turner, 1999 p147). Perpetuating ideas of fragmentation is the notion that the song should be ironically conceived upon ideas of disbandment, in this case, divorce. The speaker offers advice, 'let her into your heart' in the form of metaphors in order 'to make it better'. This is equally reflected in the song's anapaestic metre. Such continuity in metre echoes the continuity to be found within the song's reassuring advice. Another independent composition of McCartney's to offer 'words of wisdom' is 'Let it be' (Lennon and McCartney, 1970). Being the last ever single to be released, the song perhaps alludes to The Beatles' disbandment as a group in the line: 'For though they may be parted'. The lyric is enshrouded in biblical imagery: 'Mother Mary comes to me' and its denoted optimism in faith ensure that it is 'written in the style of the modern hymn' (Turner, 1999 p180).

More biblical imagery is found within 'The Ballad of John and Yoko' (Lennon and McCartney, 1969). Such religious references however, are controversial to say the least: 'Christ you know it ain't easy… The way things are going, they're going to crucify me'. Such a line is ironically witty, especially after Lennon's 'The Beatles are more popular than Christ' remarks of 1966 (The Beatles Anthology, 2003). Such imagery along with the chronological, reported style in which Lennon narrates could not be any further removed stylistically from the writing of his counterpart, McCartney. The songs can be considered the height of individual composition, thus perpetuating the idea of stylistic fragmentation. ''Hey Jude' and 'The Ballad of John and Yoko' in particular demonstrate how yet again stylistic choices force an acknowledgment of representational context.

The ultimate in postmodern anti-representation can perhaps be found in the song 'You know my name (look up the number)' (Lennon and McCartney, 1970). The song consists of entirely one line, which is its title being repeated over and over. Effectively, by 'saying nothing… [the song] says everything' (Whitely, 2000 p107). The text's meaning is therefore irreducibly 'plural' (Whitely, 2000 p117). Such plurality can be seen within

the internal fragmentation of individual songs such as 'Old Brown shoe' (Harrison, 1969). The poetry of the song is based on dualities: 'I see your smile replace every thoughtless frown' which develop internal paradoxes in a far more maturely linguistic way than 'Hello Goodbye' had previously done.

The intricate patterning of language in Lennon's 'Come Together' (Lennon and McCartney, 1969) makes the text stylistically rather interesting. The song is quite reminiscent of 'I am the Walrus', even possibly referring to it: 'He got walrus gumboot'. The juxtaposition and choice of lexis is intricate and suggests intentional complexity. However, although words are misused, the rules of grammar are still adhered to. For instance 'He got toe-jam football', is a simple sentence with a subject: 'he,' a verb: 'got' and an object: 'toe-jam football'. Trying to conjure meaning from words that are not typically associated with each other make its reading fragmented. Being grammatically correct again encourages the reader to elicit any number of 'plural' meanings from the text that may be contextually relevant, but not necessarily 'right'. Interestingly, the stylistics of this type of writing is loosely reminiscent of Lewis Carroll's 'The Jabberwocky' (1994). Perhaps this is another unconscious homage to Lennon's favoured author. One logical contextual reading of the song however, suggests that Lennon originally intended 'Come Together' as a campaign song for Timothy Leary, who was running for Governor of California in 1969 (Turner, 1999 p188). The campaign's motto is uttered in the line, 'One thing I can tell you is you got to be free'. Effectively by 'freeing himself of the constraints of language', Lennon also is able to 'loosen the rigidities of political and emotional entrenchment' (Macdonald, 2005 p359) that was the motto of Leary's campaign.

More political undertones can be found in 'Revolution' (Lennon and McCartney, 1968) and the song was supposedly written in response to the political goings on concerning the Vietnam War (Macdonald, 2005 p295). Freedom, in this case, is encouraged in favour of oppressive 'institution[s]', and points a blaming finger at the 'you' of establishment and responds with a collective empowering, plural pronoun 'we' of the people. The song implies a sense of spiritual freedom derivative of the hippy mentality: 'You better free your mind instead'. Revolution would therefore 'come about through inner change' (Turner, 1999 p169) rather the than 'destruction'. Effectively, there is a

rejection of the 'master narrative' of politics and a new juxtaposition between high and low culture. Such resistance towards the establishment (or high culture) represented through the medium of a song (low culture) is a very postmodern idea indeed. In questioning hierarchy, such texts challenge us to re-examine our presumptions about art and its role in society.

The Single 'Get Back' (Lennon and McCartney, 1969) can be seen as a pastiche of The Beatles' earlier style of song. The simple structure, repetition of 'get back' and refrain do indeed give the song an air of stylistic nostalgia. Similarly, 'Don't Let Me Down' (Lennon and McCartney, 1969) prominently reverts to the 'blues'-like despondent poetic form. Lennon also comments, 'I know we developed our own style, but we still parodied American music' (Whitely, 2000 p121). More of America is mentioned within 'Get Back':

> 'Jojo left his home in Tucson, Arizona
>
> For some California Grass.'

The song perhaps professes the need to 'get back' to The Beatles' stylistic songwriting roots that originated in American Blues poetry. As Everett (1999 p213) suggests, 'for McCartney this was to be a vehicle for reconnecting with their fans'. Despite the regression back to earlier stylistic structure, it is hard to ignore the substantial progression in tackling new subject matters within these songs. Postmodernism would perhaps dictate that these songs are stylistic structural pastiches of earlier songs but have now been placed in a new fragmented context; again, this inextricably links stylistics and context.

Arguably, any Beatles song has some postmodern credibility. However, the lack of any stylistic common thread within these last few singles give the stage as a whole a postmodern feel. Such fragmentation within each song's style could perhaps be described as 'a multiplicity of arguments never arriving at agreement' (Whitley, 2000 p106) that consequently led to the disbandment of The Beatles.

Conclusion

The Beatles as songwriters at the beginning of their career were perhaps driven by the need to succeed. The theme of love, conventional use of rhyme, repetition, refrain and simple lexical choices, especially the use of the pronoun, can be seen as strategic stylistic choices fulfilling commercial requirements in order to establish themselves and sell records. This method undeniably worked. The theme of love is undoubtedly a universal one, although later songs seized opportunities for raising awareness in ways that pushed the boundaries of stylistic structure. The intrinsic 'you' and 'I' perspective had transitioned into matters of global substance in songs such as 'Revolution'. Stylistics and context as Simpson (2004 p3) points out are therefore 'inextricably' dependent upon each other and to a certain degree evolved the songwriting style of The Beatles. Undeniably The Beatles developed original stylistic ways of reflecting political matters and a new 'hippy' cultural attitude of the time. Therefore The Beatles can no longer be seen as songwriters but the innovative voice of a generation. If this is to be taken into consideration, it is the listener's perspective that now becomes important, as it is their interpretation that has transposed its meaning into something more than a song.

The removal of the author, as Barthes (1968) suggests, means that it is the reader's ability to interpret a text that makes it become important, as 'a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination' (Barthes, 1968 p232). Undoubtedly there remains interest in The Beatles as songwriters, but to always attempt to explain a text in relation to its author is to 'impose a limit on that text' (Barthes, 1968 p231). The reader is said to have no 'history, biography [or] psychology' (Barthes, 1968 p232) which also suggests that a listener's interpretation of a Beatles song in the present has just as much significance as a person who listened to it in the 1960's. For instance, one blatant homage to the songs of The Beatles can be found within the 2007 film, 'Across the Universe All You Need is Love', where a whole film narrative is stylistically structured around the songs of The Beatles. Even more recently a Beatles song appeared in a television advert for the furniture store, John Lewis (2008). The advert's slogan, presumably intended to boost sales for the Christmas period: 'If you know the person, you'll know the present', is accompanied by the apt Beatles song 'From Me to You'. Stylistically reconstructed the song is now sung by a child. Graphically, the song is set amidst an understated grey backdrop and presents presumably that 'special someone' with 'the perfect gift'

which, as the song suggests, will be given 'with love from me to you'. Such stylistic representation significantly alters the song's contextual meaning according to a new purpose. Obscurely modest in its stylistic construct, the advert is not the stereotypical picture of Christmas at all. This is in contrast to the lavish Marks and Spencer Christmas advert campaign (The Guardian, 2008). This advert elaborately presents a formulaic classic Christmas complete with decorations, food, luxury gifts and snow presented to us by 'fashionable' celebrities. It also attempts to update the traditional Christmas song 'Winter Wonderland' with a version sung by contemporary singer Macy Gray. It is interesting how the reworking of the Beatles song 'From Me to You' seems more aptly innovative and relevant in this instance. This new manipulation of the stylistic structure of Beatles songs illustrates how the songs have the ability to transpose time and meaning according to the interpretive context of a new generation.

Therefore, the songs have evolved stylistically even further than the limits of the Sixties decade. Not only do they reflect the social change of decade, an important part of twentieth century history, but also bear significance within today's popular culture. The songs of The Beatles are therefore irrefutably an important contemporary discourse. It can be concluded that the context which seemed to dictate The Beatles' stylistic choices as songwriters can only evolve the songs to a certain degree. It is the scope for stylistic interpretation of Beatles songs that is limitless and the ways in which we as listeners do this is what will continue the evolution of Beatles songs.

REFERENCES

BERNSTEIN, G.A; HEKTNER, J.M; BORCHARDT, C.M; and MCMILLAN, M.H. (2001) *Across the Universe, All You Need is Love* (2007) Julie Taymor [DVD] Columbia Pictures/ Sony Pictures, Home Entertainment

ALDRIDGE, A. (1998) *The Beatles Illustrated Lyrics.* 3rd ed. London: Little, Brown and Company

BARTHES, R. (1990 [1968]) 'The Death of the Author' in Walder, D. (Ed.) *Literature in the Modern World. Critical Essays and Documents.* (First written in Image-Music-Text) New York: Oxford University Press Inc. pp228-232

CARROLL, L. (1994 [1872]) *Through the Looking-glass and What Alice Found There.* London: Puffin Books

COOK, G and MERCER, N. (2000) 'From me to you: Austerity to Profligacy in the Language of The Beatles.' In Inglis, I. (Ed.) *The Beatles, popular music and society, A thousand voices.* London: Macmillan: 86-104.

CROSS, C. (2005) *The Beatles, Day-by-Day, Song-by-Song, Record-by-Record.* Lincolne: iUniverse

EVERETT, W. (1999) *The Beatles as Musicians, Revolver through the Anthology.* New York: Oxford University Press

INGLIS, I. (1997) "Variations on a theme: The love songs of The Beatles." *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music.* [online] 28 (1) 37-62 Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108435 (Accessed: 18 March 2008)

John Lewis (2008) Digital Channel E4, 17 November.

MACDONALD, I. (2005) *Revolution in the Head, The Beatles records and the sixties.* 2nd Ed. London: Pimilco

MARCHBANK, P. (1978) *Beatles in their own words.* London: Omnibus Press

PADGETT, R. (2000) *The Teachers and Writers handbook of Poetic Forms.* 2nd Ed. New York: Teachers and Writers Collaborative

RECK, D. R. (1985) "Beatles Orientalis: Influences from Asia in a Popular Song Tradition." *Asian Music.* [online] 16 (1) 83-149 Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/834014

SELDEN, R., WIDDOWSON, P., and BROOKER, P. (2005) *A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory.* 5th Ed. Harlowe: Longman Accessed: 6 April 2008)

SIMPSON, P. (2004) *Stylistics, A resource book for students.* London: Routledge

The Beatles Anthology (2003) [DVD] Apple Corps Ltd.

THE GUARDIAN (2008) Marks and Spencer Unveils Christmas Campaign. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/nov/12/advertising-marks-and-spencer-christmas

(Accessed: 12 February 2009)

TURNER, S. (1999) *A Hard days Write. The stories behind every Beatles song.* A revised edition. London: Index/ Carlton Books Limited

WALDRON, E. E. (1971) "The blues poetry of Langston Hughes." *Negro American Literature Forum.* [online] 5 (4) 140-149 Available at: http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0028-2480%28197124%295%3A4%3C140%3ATBPOLH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V (Accessed: 26 March 2008)

WHITELY, E. (2000) 'The Postmodern White Album' In Inglis, I. (Ed.) *The Beatles, popular music and society, A thousand voices.* London: Macmillan: 105-125.

WIDDOWSON, H. G. (1992) *Practical Stylistics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Newman
University College
Birmingham

ARTICLES